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When does a perceptual experience as of my hands provide justification
for me to believe that I have hands? One initially plausible positive require-
ment is that I must have reasons to believe something else: that my experience
is veridical. Also plausible is the negative requirement that I must not have
reasons to believe that my experience is in this case non-veridical. Dogmatists
about perception reject the positive requirement and embrace the negative one,
holding that perceptual justification is immediate — it doesn’t rest upon any
other justification that I possess — but it is also defeasible, and in particular
it is underminable.
Whereas Dogmatism is a theory in the epistemology of perception,
Bayesianism is a theory of coherence for partial beliefs and of how coherence
it to be maintained in the face of new evidence. Just as it is incoherent to
believe both I have hands and ¬(I have hands), it is incoherent to be highly
vi
confident in both of those propositions. Bayesianism o↵ers a formal account
of this latter type of coherence. Importantly, though Bayesianism is a theory
of coherence, it is not a coherence theory of the sort defended by Davidson
and BonJour: it is not an attempt to explain all facts about justification in
terms of facts about coherence. Hence the Bayesian’s claim that partial beliefs
are subject to norms of coherence is at least prima facie consistent with the
Dogmatist’s claim that some beliefs are immediately justified by experience.
I develop and defend Bayesian Dogmatism. I begin by responding to an
argument advanced by Cohen, Hawthorne, Schi↵er, andWhite, which purports
to show that Bayesians cannot model episodes of perceptual learning in which
the proposition learned is both immediately justified and defeasible. I go on to
respond to arguments from Weisberg, which purport to show that Bayesianism
is inconsistent with underminable perceptual learning. Finally, I defend the
superiority of Je↵rey Conditionalization to Holistic Conditionalization as a
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How to be a Bayesian Dogmatist1
1.1 Introduction
I’m walking down the street and I have a visual experience as of a
red ball lying on the grass. What’s the epistemic significance of my having
had that experience? One likely result is that I obtain some justification for
a belief about my own experiences, something like I’ve had an experience as
if there’s a red ball lying on the grass. Another is that I obtain some justi-
fication for a belief about the world, something like there’s a red ball lying
on the grass. Yet another is that I now find myself with justification to be-
lieve further propositions inferentially related to the first two: if I already had
justification to believe that there’s a bike on the grass and then I have my
perceptual experience as of the ball, I obtain some justification for believing
there are at least two toys on the grass. My justification for the last of these
three propositions is unambiguously mediate, as it’s at least in part my justi-
fication for believing something else that makes me justified in believing that
there are at least two toys on the grass. In contrast, my justification for be-
lieving I’ve had an experience as if there’s a red ball lying on the grass comes
1For a published version of his chapter see: Brian T. Miller. How to be a Bayesian
Dogmatist. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, forthcoming.
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directly from the experience itself without the mediation of some other justi-
fication that I have, and hence that justification is immediate. That much is
common ground between Inferentialist and Dogmatist accounts of perceptual
justification. What’s contentious between the two is the status of the second
proposition.
According to the Dogmatist, perceptual justification is both immediate2
and underminable3 (see Pryor [2000], [2005], [2013]). Moreover, the Dogma-
tist thinks that while a perceptual experience may generate immediate and
underminable justification for I’m having an experience as if A or some other
proposition about the agent’s mental states, it also generates immediate and
underminable justification for A itself.
In contrast, the Inferentialist claims that my beliefs about the external
world are never immediately justified (at least not on the basis of experience),
but rather depend upon an inference from an immediately justified proposition
about my own experiences together with an auxiliary proposition connecting
facts about my experiences to facts about the external world, e.g. If I have
a perceptual experience as if A then, probably, A. Hence it’s my justification
2My justification for believing that A is immediate unless it is in part my having jus-
tification to believe something else that makes me justified in believing that A. ‘Makes’
here expresses a relation of epistemic dependence, a variety of modal dependence. Hence
Dogmatism shouldn’t be confused with the much stronger thesis that having a perceptual
experience in the absence of defeaters is su cient for obtaining perceptual justification, as
we allow that there might be other necessary conditions for obtaining perceptual justifica-
tion besides my having justification to believe something else, as long as the satisfaction of
that condition is not part of what makes me justified.
3For the distinction between undermining/ undercutting and opposing/ rebutting de-
featers see [Pollock and Cruz, 1999, 196-7].
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for believing I’ve had an experience as if there’s a red ball lying on the grass
together with my justification for believing some such auxiliary proposition
that makes it the case that I have justification for believing there’s a red ball
lying on the grass, and so that last bit of justification is mediate.
Dogmatism makes obtaining perceptual justification relatively easy:
any agent capable of having a contentful experience and lacking defeaters is in a
position to obtain justification for lots of beliefs about the world without first
acquiring justification for beliefs about the relationship between experience
and the external world. Whether this is ultimately a virtue of the theory or a
shortcoming is contentious: easily acquired justification for propositions about
the external world might be thought to license too-easy responses to skepti-
cal challenges to our knowledge of the external world and too-easy knowledge
of the reliability of our perceptual faculties. If Inferentialism is correct then
obtaining perceptual justification is in some sense harder, as we first need
justification to believe the auxiliary proposition connecting the having of an
experience with facts about the world. Making it harder to obtain percep-
tual justification comes with its own set of problems, as now we’re faced with
the di cult task of explaining where justification for believing the auxiliary
propositions comes from, potentially leaving skeptical problems insoluble.
In this essay I defend Dogmatism against a very di↵erent objection:
that it is inconsistent with Bayesianism. The Bayesian Argument (as I’ll call
it) purports to show that given Bayesianism, acquiring perceptual justifica-
tion for believing there’s a red ball lying on the grass requires that I already
3
have justification for ruling out a wide range of skeptical scenarios on which
my experience as of the ball lying on the grass is non-veridical. If obtaining
perceptual justification for believing that B requires that I already have justi-
fication for believing that A, then (the objection goes) it’s plausible that my
justification for A is what makes me justified in believing B, in which case my
justification for believing that B isn’t immediate. Since this result allegedly
follows from the Bayesian formalism, we thereby have some reason to believe
that Dogmatism and Bayesianism are inconsistent, and since Bayesianism is
an attractive theory we thereby have a reason to reject Dogmatism.
The literature contains two types of response to this argument on be-
half of the Dogmatist. The first response is to accept the inconsistency of
Dogmatism and Bayesianism and take that as a good reason to revise ortho-
dox Bayesianism (see Weatherson [2007]). The second and seemingly more
common response is to accept the formal result — that a necessary condition
for obtaining justification for believing the content of perceptual experience
is having antecedent justification for believing some other proposition — but
then to deny that it entails the mediacy of perceptual justification. One way to
do this would be to take inspiration from Silins [2007] and argue that having
justification to believe that A might be a necessary condition for obtaining
justification for believing that B without A being what makes it the case that
I have that justification for believing that B. Mere modal dependence just
isn’t what matters when it comes to questions of immediacy, and hence my
4
justification for believing that B might nonetheless be immediate.4
I pursue a third response to the Bayesian Argument on behalf of the
Dogmatist: I deny that the putatively problematic formal result is a commit-
ment of the Bayesian at all. The derivation of that result requires a premise
that goes beyond the core commitments of Bayesianism to specify precisely
how the epistemic significance of experience should be reflected in the formal
model. This requires that I be clear about exactly what the Bayesian is and
is not committed to, an issue that I discuss in section 1.2. In section 1.3 I
lay out the formal details of the Bayesian Argument. The heart of the paper
is found in section 1.4, in which I identify the problematic premise and argue
both that it is optional for the Bayesian and that it is prejudicial against the
Dogmatist. I then o↵er an alternative account of how the epistemic impact
of experience should be incorporated into Bayesian models. In section 1.5 I
consider the implications of adopting my suggestion for various versions of
Bayesianism, concluding that the Dogmatist should embrace a version that
incorporates Richard Je↵rey’s permissive approach to conditionalization over
the strict approach of the Classical Bayesian.
4A second way to accept the formal result of the Bayesian Argument without abandoning
Dogmatism exploits the fact that Dogmatism is discussed in the idiom of reasons while
Bayesianism is discussed in the idiom of credences. Translating between the two idioms
is not entirely straightforward. In particular, it’s not obvious that obtaining a reason to
believe that A always leads to an increased credence A. See Kung [2010] and Zardini [2014].
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1.2 Bayesianism
Bayesianism is a theory of the rationality of partial belief states. The
starting assumption is that an agent’s partial beliefs can be represented as
a function from propositions to numbers representing that agent’s subjec-
tive probability or credence that various propositions are true. The core of
Bayesianism is the postulation of two necessary conditions on the rationality
of a credence. The first is Probabilism:
Probabilism: all rationally permissible credence functions are probabilisti-
cally coherent (i.e. consistent with the probability axioms).
Probabilism imposes a synchronic constraint upon rational credence
functions. Constraining the rationality of revisions to those credence func-
tions over time is the thesis of Conditionalization. Conditionalization requires
that we divide our credences into two types: conditional and unconditional.
Whereas unconditional credences reflect an agent’s degree of confidence in
the truth of a proposition considered on its own, conditional credences reflect
the agent’s confidence in a proposition given the truth of some other propo-
sition. For example, the agent might assign a low unconditional credence to
the street is wet but a much higher credence to it given it’s raining : formally,
P (the street is wet) < P (the street is wet | it’s raining). The intuition mo-
tivating Conditionalization is that the credences that an agent should adopt
in the future upon obtaining new information are importantly constrained by
6
the conditional credences that he or she holds right now, and that those con-
straints are encoded in the agent’s currently held conditional credences. I’ll
be discussing two ways of making this intuition rigorous. First:
Strict Conditionalization: If I revise my credence in B to 1 then I must






It is important to note that according to Strict Conditionalization,
incorporating new information B by conditionalizing upon it requires changing
P (B) to 1.5 Je↵rey Conditionalization generalizes Strict Conditionalization by
allowing updates upon changes in credences to values other than 1:
Je↵rey Conditionalization: If I revise my credence in B to any value then
I must set my new credence in A equal to the weighted sum of A con-










For our purposes Classical Bayesianism is the combination of Probabil-
ism and Strict Conditionalization and Je↵rey Bayesianism is the combination
5For reasons that I discuss in section 1.4.1, especially fn. 13, I’ll assume throughout
the essay that proponents of Strict Conditionalization will prohibit ‘exogenous’ credence
revisions (again, see section 1.4.1) to values less than 1.
6See [Je↵rey, 1983, 169]. Je↵rey goes on to generalize this condition to accommodate
changes to the partition involving more than two propositions, a complication inessential to
the present essay.
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of Probabilism and Je↵rey Conditionalization. Since my task in this essay is
to show the Bayesian Argument exposes no great tension between Dogmatism
and either version of Bayesianism, I will proceed to show that the argument
exposes no great tension between Dogmatism and the combination of Prob-
abilism and either version of Conditionalization (though later on I settle on
Je↵rey Bayesianism as the better complement to Dogmatism).
1.3 The Bayesian Argument Against Dogmatism
For the Dogmatist, possessing an undermining defeater blocks the ac-
quisition of perceptual justification, but lacking justification to reject an un-
dermining defeater is perfectly consistent with the acquisition of perceptual
justification. To illustrate, consider BIV, the hypothesis that I’m a handless
brain in a vat having experiences as of my hands (i.e. the sorts of experiences
that we expect to have when we look down past the ends of our wrists). Dog-
matists hold that if I have high levels of justification for believing that BIV is
true then my experience as of my hands will fail to generate much justification
for the proposition I have hands, as the justificatory force of the experience
is undermined. But Dogmatists also hold that I don’t need justification for
believing that BIV is false in order to acquire justification for I have hands
from my experience. It’s this last point that is the target of the Bayesian
Argument.
BIV is the hypothesis that I’m a handless brain in a vat having experi-
ences as of my hands, and so BIV implies that I’m having an experience as of
8




(¬BIV | e)  P
old
(¬BIV )
When I have an experience as of my hands I thereby obtain some justification
for believing that I’m having an experience as of my hands. According to
Conditionalization I must now update upon that changed credence in e,8 and
so:9
7Proof: BIV ✏ e, so P (e | BIV ) = 1   P (e), so P (BIV | e)   P (BIV ) (by Bayes’s
Theorem), so P (¬BIV | e)  P (¬BIV ).
8While this is correct as far as it goes — Conditionalization does indeed require that we
update upon changes to the probabilities that we assign to propositions like e — I will argue
in section 1.4 that updating upon e alone is both unwarranted and key to the argument.
Nonetheless at this point I’ll suppose that it is correct in order to present my opponent’s
argument.
9In particular, (2) is meant to follow from Strict Conditionalization (plus the description
of the case). The argument is slightly di↵erent when Je↵rey Conditionalization is employed,
as (2) now becomes:
P
new









As I note in section 1.4.3, for our purposes BIV is equivalent to the hypothesis that e&¬h,
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e&¬h is at least possible, and so P
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(h | e) < 1. As a result, the higher the value of
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new
(e) the lower the value of P
new
(¬e _ h). This is most easily seen by first considering
the case in which P
new
(e) = 0. In that case P
new
(¬e) = 1, and so P
new
(¬e _ h) = (P
old
(h |
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Combining terms from (1) and (2) we get:
(3) P
new
(¬BIV )  P
old
(¬BIV )
BIV is the hypothesis that I’m a handless brain in a vat having an experience
as of my hands. If I have hands then I’m not a handless brain in a vat having
an experience as of my hands, and so in that case BIV is false. Taking h as












What (5) says is that my credence in ¬BIV before I had the experience as of







(e) increases. Importantly, however, the changes
aren’t proportional: since P
old
(h | e) < 1, when the value of P
new





(e) is smaller than the decrease in 1(P
new
(¬e)). Hence if P
new
(·)
is the credence that I ought to adopt upon increasing my confidence in e (and nothing
else) and updating accordingly, then P
new
(¬e _ h) < P
old










(¬e _ h)) < P
old
(¬e _ h))
In plain English, if P
new
is the credence function that I adopt as a result of increasing
my confidence in e (and nothing else) and updating accordingly, then my new credence in
h must actually be lower than my old credence in ¬e _ h, i.e. in ¬BIV .
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the credence that I adopt after having an experience as of my hands and
conditionalizing. Since the Dogmatist thinks that after having an experience
as of my hands my credence in the proposition I have hands is very high, that
means that my prior credence in ¬BIV must have been very high as well.
That’s tantamount to saying that assigning a high credence to ¬BIV is a
necessary condition for assigning a high credence to I have hands on the basis
of my perceptual experiences, which (it is claimed) is inconsistent with the
hypothesis that my perceptual justification for I have hands is immediate.10
Analogous arguments show that no perceptual justification is immediate, and
so Dogmatism is false.
1.4 Modeling Experience
The Bayesian Argument is valid. (1) and (4) follow from Probabilism,
the Ratio Analysis of conditional probability (see section 1.5), and the logical
relations that obtain between BIV , h, and e. (3) is a consequence of (1) and
(2). But what about (2), that P
new
(¬BIV ) = P
old
(¬BIV | e)? Rejecting
any other step in the argument requires giving up on Probabilism (and hence
giving up on Bayesianism itself), but not so with (2). If (2) is false then the
10That the existence of such a necessary condition is inconsistent with the immediacy of
perceptual justification is far from obvious, as I discussed in fn. 2. However, if we rely
on that point to respond to the Bayesian Argument we are essentially denying that (5)
is problematic without disputing its truth, and hence we must still concede that obtaining
perceptual justification requires that we already have justification for assigning low credences
to the relevant skeptical hypotheses. I find that implausible, and so in what follows I o↵er
a response that allows the rejection of (5) without requiring the rejection of Bayesianism
itself.
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argument for (5) is unsound, and so the putative tension between Dogmatism
and Bayesianism is resolved.
But how can we reject (2) without rejecting Conditionalization? Note
that there are two importantly di↵erent ways of thinking about credence func-
tion P
new
(·) and so two importantly di↵erent ways of thinking about (2).
P
new
(·) might be understood simply as the credence function resulting from
having P
old
(·) and then updating on e, and in that case (2) is a trivial conse-
quence of Conditionalization. Alternately, P
new
(·) might be understood only
as the credence function that an agent who holds P
old
(·) ought to adopt after
having an experience as of his hands and updating accordingly, whatever that
function happens to be.
This is important because in order to avoid equivocation, P
new
(·) must
be interpreted the same at (2) and at (5). If P
new
(·) is interpreted in the first of
these two ways, then all (5) says is that updating on e (and e alone) can’t raise
P
new
(h) any higher than P
old
(¬BIV ). But Dogmatism isn’t a theory of how
an agent with P
old
(·) who updates on e ought to revise his beliefs; it’s a theory
of how an agent with P
old
(·) who has an experience as if he has hands ought
to revise his beliefs. Hence in order for (5) to pose a challenge to Dogmatism,
P
new
(·) must be understood as the credence function that an agent who holds
P
old
(·) ought to adopt after having an experience as of his hands and updating
accordingly.
The two interpretations of P
new
(·) aren’t necessarily inconsistent: it
may be that the credence function that an agent ought to adopt upon having
12
an experience as if h just is the one that results from updating on e and e
alone, and in that case the two interpretations are equivalent. But that’s a
substantive assumption, and as I argue below the Dogmatist has independent
reasons to reject it. After all, Dogmatists think that my experience as if h
provides immediate justification not just for e, but for h as well. In that case




(· | e), and so the interpretation of P
new
(·)
on which (2) is a trivial consequence of Conditionalization is distinct from the
interpretation that makes (5) problematic for Dogmatism.
My proposal, then, is that instead of (or in addition to) updating on
e = I’m having an experience as if I have hands Bayesian Dogmatists should
update on h = I have hands. This is consistent with both Classical and Je↵rey
Bayesianism (see section 1.4.1), though for independent reasons its combina-
tion with Classical Bayesianism is unappealing to the Dogmatist. Indeed, I
will later argue that adopting Je↵rey Bayesianism, together with the thought
that it is upon h that we should update (and not merely upon e), not only
allows the Dogmatist to avoid (5), but also provides a very natural way for
the Dogmatist to model perceptual learning in a Bayesian framework.11
11Compare [Pryor, 2013, sec. 6]. Since I completed this essay, a somewhat similar ap-
proach has appeared in Moretti [2015]. Our responses to the issue are, nevertheless, im-
portantly di↵erent. According to Moretti, a basic problem with White’s argument (i.e. the
Bayesian Argument) is that it requires updating on a belief rather than on an experience
— it ‘presuppose[s] a notion of perceptual evidence that is not the one distinctive of dog-
matism’ [271]. But all Bayesian models share that requirement — you can’t conditionalize
on an experience! — and hence if White’s presupposition is inconsistent with Dogmatism
then Bayesianism is inconsistent with Dogmatism too. This rests on a mistake: what’s
required is simply that we allow experiences to spark credence revisions that are exogenous
to the model (see section 1.4.1 below); without some such allowance it’s hard to see how
13
1.4.1 Bayesianism Does Not Entail (2)
I begin by showing that updating on h and hence rejecting (2) is per-
fectly consistent with Bayesianism. My comments in this section will apply
equally to both the Je↵rey and the Classical versions of Bayesianism except
where I specify otherwise.
I described in section 1.2 how Bayesians construct formal models of
agents’ partial belief states and of revisions to those states over time. It’s
important to note that these are at best partial models of rational credence
revision. Given Conditionalization, a prior credence function plus a revised cre-
dence in some proposition completely determine the posterior credence func-
tion that must be adopted: if I revise my credence in B to 1, then the model
determines that I should revise my credence in A to my prior credence in: A
conditional on B. What the model does not determine is the rational status
of my initial revision to my credence in B.
What does determine the rational status of the credence revisions that
spark conditionalization? Clearly these can’t all be the result of other con-
ditionalizations, as the process of conditionalization only gets going with a
change in credence and ends as soon as the new credence function is adopted.
Hence if there are to be any rationally permitted credence revisions at all
there must be some that do not proceed by conditionalization. At least some
the epistemic significance of experience could ever make it into a Bayesian model.
On my view, White’s argument is unsound not because he updates on a proposition, but
because he updates on the wrong proposition.
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credence revisions are rational, and hence any plausible version of Bayesian-
ism must accept the permissibility of at least some credence revisions that
don’t proceed via conditionalization. All of the credence revisions that are
modeled by the Bayesian formalism are conditionalizations, so it follows that
some rationally permissible credence revisions are not modeled. Call those
credence revisions that are not modeled by the Bayesian exogenous revisions
(as in exogenous to the model) and those occurring within the model via con-
ditionalization endogenous revisions.
Two points about exogenous credence revisions are worth emphasizing.
First, the rational permissibility of an exogenous revision is largely uncon-
strained by the Bayesian machinery. Probabilism prohibits the adoption of
any probabilistically incoherent credence and so it prohibits exogenous revi-
sions that are themselves probabilistically incoherent. For example, I cannot
revise my credence in A&¬A to any value other than 0. Je↵rey Condition-
alization imposes no additional constraints upon the appropriateness of the
exogenous inputs: its sole function is to determine the appropriate response
to a given revision. Hence any exogenous credence revision is consistent with
Probabilism and Je↵rey Conditionalization as long is it is probabilistically
coherent with itself.12
Things are a bit more complicated with Strict Conditionalization, on
which updating is permitted only on propositions assigned a credence of 1.
12Assuming that the credence was between 0 and 1 before the revision.
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Exogenous credence revisions that don’t lead to updating can result in an in-
coherent posterior credence function,13 so there’s good reason for the Classical
Bayesian to prohibit exogenous revisions that cannot be updated upon, i.e.
to prohibit exogenous revisions to credences other that 1. Nonetheless, any
exogenous credence revision is consistent with Classical Bayesianism as long
as (i) it is probabilistically coherent with itself and (ii) the credence of the
proposition being exogenously revised is thereby raised all the way to 1.14
The second point is that the process of incorporating the epistemic
impact of having had a perceptual experience must begin with an exogenous
credence revision. Suppose that that’s false, and the credence revisions that
result from having a perceptual experience are entirely endogenous and so
proceed by conditionalization. As we’ve seen, conditionalization results from
a change in credence or subjective probability: I update on it’s raining not
when it’s actually true that it’s raining but when my credence or subjective
probability in it’s raining changes. All instances of conditionalization begin
with a change in credence and end with a change in credence. In contrast,
when I revise my credences in response to a perceptual experience, the process
begins with something that isn’t a change in credence — the actual having
of the experience — and ends with a change in credence. Hence the initial
13If my credence function started out coherent and I exogenously revise my credence in a





(·) is coherent, then P
old
(¬A) = 3/10. If I exogenously revise my credence
in A so that P
new
(A) = 1 without updating, then P
new
(A) = 3/10. Since A and ¬A are
inconsistent, P
new




(¬A), which in this case is 13/10.
14Again assuming that the credence in that proposition was between 0 and 1 before the
revision.
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credence revision coming in response to perceptual experience can’t proceed via
conditionalization and hence can’t be endogenous to the Bayesian machinery.
With these points in mind I return to (2), that upon having an expe-
rience as of my hand I must set P
new
(¬BIV ) equal to P
old
(¬BIV | e). It’s
now clear that adopting P
new
(·) required two credence revisions: an exogenous
revision in response to the experience, and an endogenous revision resulting
from conditionalizing upon that exogenously revised credence. It’s also clear
that the Bayesian machinery constrains the endogenous revision but for the
most part does not constrain the exogenous one, and that neither Probabilism
nor Conditionalization require that the exogenous revision be on I’m having
an experience as if I have hands rather than on I have hands or on some other
proposition.
If we suppose that it’s my credence in e (and e alone) that I revise in
light of my experience then Bayesianism ensures the truth of (2), but Bayesian-
ism is simply silent about whether updating my credence in e is the right way
to respond to my experience. Hence Bayesianism is silent concerning whether
the credence function that I ought to adopt in light of having my experi-
ence, P
new
(·) is equal to P
old
(· | e). So the rejection of (2) is consistent with
Bayesianism.
1.4.2 Dogmatists should update on h
Dogmatists claim that perceptual experience can generate immediate
justification, but they also go further and specify precisely which proposition is
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immediately justified by an experience: the proposition constituting the con-
tent of that experience. So for the Dogmatist, a perceptual experience as of A
typically generates immediate justification for believing A. Inferentialists deny
that my justification for believing A is immediate, but that doesn’t commit
them to saying that no proposition is immediately justified by the experience.
The Inferentialist thinks that obtaining justification for believing the content
A of a perceptual experience requires justification for believing I’m having an
experience as if A, and also justification for believing some auxiliary proposi-
tion such as If I’ve had an experience as if A then, probably, A. Though on that
picture my justification for believing that A can’t be immediate, presumably
my justification for believing that I’m having an experience as of A is imme-
diate. Hence the Dogmatist and the Inferentialist agree that my perceptual
experience as of A generates at least some immediate justification, they just
disagree about which proposition it immediately justifies.
How is this talk of immediate justification to be translated into the
Bayesian idiom of credences? One thought is that my obtaining immediate
justification for believing that A is tantamount to rationally increasing my
credence in A without conditionalizing on something else in order to do so.15
In other words, obtaining immediate justification for believing that A just is
exogenously revising your credence upward in A in a rational way. Since the
Dogmatist thinks that upon having an experience as of A I become imme-
diately justified in believing that A, there’s a strong prima facie case that a
15See Pryor’s ‘Assumption 2’ [2013, 105].
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Bayesian Dogmatist should think that upon having that experience I should
exogenously raise my credence in A and then update upon it. Similarly, since
the Inferentialist thinks that upon having an experience as of A I become
immediately justified in believing that I’m having an experience as of A, a
Bayesian Inferentialist should think that upon having that experience I should
exogenously raise my confidence in I’m having an experience as of A and then
update upon it.
As I’ve noted, (2) is not neutral concerning what we update upon: it
requires that I update on facts about my experience rather than the content of
my experience. But that requirement begs the question against the Dogmatist,
who should reject it even without the putative problem that the Bayesian
Argument brings to light.
Before moving on I’d like to briefly sketch an objection raised by Roger
White in his [2006, 534-5]. According to White, even if having an experience
as of my hands provides immediate justification for believing h = I have hands,
it no doubt also provides immediate justification for believing I’m having an
experience as if I have hands, and hence I should also exogenously raise my
credence in e. In that case Conditionalization requires that I update upon e,
and so what does it matter if we also conditionalize on h? Won’t updating
on e raise my confidence in BIV , and hence even further limit my confidence
in h? And in that case isn’t the Dogmatist still stuck with the problematic
conclusion at (5) after all?
No. The success of the Bayesian Argument does not depend on whether
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we update on e, but on whether we update on h. Allowing exogenous revisions
to h means that my prior credence in BIV no longer limits my posterior
credence in h, and hence the putatively problematic (5) is false. To see this
point, however, it’s helpful to first appreciate exactly how updating on h solves
the problem, and so I put o↵ my full response to White’s objection until the
end of the next section.
1.4.3 How updating on h resolves the problem
Intuitively, the problem with learning that h by updating on e is that
my posterior credence in h is limited by my prior credence in ¬BIV , and so
if updating on e allows me to become highly confident in h then I must have
started out highly confident in ¬BIV . In other words, when I update on e, my
prior credence in ¬BIV caps my posterior credence in h. This capping e↵ect is
not unique to BIV , e, and h, or to the matter of perceptual justification. The
relevant features of the case are that it’s e alone that’s being conditionalized
upon, that BIV ✏ e, that BIV ✏ ¬h, and that ¬(e ✏ h) — the capping e↵ect
will be the same for any case meeting those conditions.
The situation changes dramatically when we also update upon h. Since
h and BIV are inconsistent, Probabilism requires that that P
old
(BIV | h) = 0.
If upon having an experience as of my hands I strictly conditionalize only on
h, then P
new
(BIV ) = P
old
(BIV | h), and so P
new
(BIV ) must be 0 as well.
In other words, if my experience makes it rational to exogenously revise my
credence in h to 1 then I’m forced to become maximally confident that I’m
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not a handless brain in a vat having hand-like experiences. Hence even though
I can’t be any more confident in h than I am in ¬BIV — after all, (4) is a
theorem of the probability calculus — my credence in ¬BIV is already as high
as it can go and so my new credence in h is not in any way constrained.
It’s important not to interpret this conclusion too strongly. What I
have shown is that the formal commitments of Bayesianism do not entail that
my credence in h after having an experience as of my hands is limited by my
prior credence in ¬BIV . What I have not shown, and what I do not believe to
be true, is that facts about my epistemic state before I’ve had an experience
as of my hands can never constrain the attitudes that I ought to adopt once
I’ve had that experience.
So what determines whether my justification for believing a defeater
at t
1
constrains my attitude at t
2
toward h, or whether at t
2
I should change
my attitude toward that defeater in light of my new attitude toward h? I’m
not o↵ering a positive account here, merely pointing out that the formal com-
mitments of the Bayesian do not force an answer upon us. That formalism
constrains only the credence revisions that it models and no credence revision
immediately resulting from experience is modeled. Hence no credence revision
immediately resulting from experience and a↵ected by the agent’s possession
of a defeater is modeled. The point is simply that if the inputs to the Bayesian
model are themselves defeasible then that defeat is an o↵-model phenomenon
and hence will not be constrained or explained by the Bayesian formalism. In
other words, it’s not that the credence that one ought to adopt in light of an
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experience is unconstrained by one’s preexisting attitudes, but rather that the
e↵ects of those constraints are felt outside of the formal model.16
We are now in a position to respond to the objection from White that
I sketched at the end of section 1.4.2. White objected that even if having
an experience as of my hands makes it permissible to exogenously raise my
credence in h, it also makes it permissible to exogenously revise my credence in
e, in which case e must be among the propositions that I conditionalize upon.
The idea seems to be that this implies (2) — that P
new
(¬BIV ) = P
old
(¬BIV |
e) — and hence the Dogmatist is still stuck with (5).
White is no doubt correct that having an experience as of my hands
provides me with immediate justification for believing that I’ve had an expe-
rience as if I have hands, and so e should be among the propositions that I
update upon. It’s also true that my posterior credence in h will be capped by
my prior credence in ¬BIV if e is the only proposition that I conditionalize
upon in response to my experience. I’ve proposed that agents should update
on whatever propositions are immediately justified by their experience, and
Dogmatists think that h is one of those propositions. Hence the view that
White is objecting to — Bayesian Dogmatism with my proposal for what to
update upon — Is one on which the agent ought to update both on e and on
h. For the Classical Bayesian, updating on e and also on h is equivalent to
16David Christensen [1992] has argued that permitting o↵-model defeat constitutes an
unacceptable limitation on the explanatory ambitions of the Bayesian who accepts defeasible
inputs to the model and hence poses a serious problem for Je↵rey Bayesianism.
22
updating on e&h,17
and so on this proposal P
new
(¬BIV ) = P
old
(¬BIV | e&h). Since e&h
implies ¬BIV , P
old
(¬BIV | e&h) and P
new
(¬BIV ) must both be 1, and so
updating on e&h solves the problem for the Classical Bayesian for exactly the
same reason that updating on h alone solves the problem.18
So where exactly does the objection go wrong? The assumption seems
to be that updating on e is a su cient condition for producing the capping
e↵ect that I discussed above, i.e. it commits the Dogmatist to premise (2)
and hence to conclusion (5). But that’s just wrong: updating on h in addition
to e implies that (2) is actually false,19 as now P
new
(¬BIV ) should be set to
P
old
(¬BIV | e&h) rather than to P
old
(¬BIV | e).
1.5 Varieties of Bayesianism
Let’s take stock. Dogmatists are committed to two theses about percep-
tual justification: that it’s immediate, and that it’s underminable. Bayesians
are committed to two theses of their own: Probabilism and Conditionalization.
17Due to the commutativity of Strict Conditionalization, the order of update does not
a↵ect the credence function thats ultimately adopted. See Weisberg [2009].
18For the Je↵ery Bayesian updating on e and on h needn’t be equivalent to updating
on e&h, but that conjunction will be an element of the partition updated upon, as will
e&¬h, ¬e&h, and ¬e&¬h. Conditionalizing on this partition involves assigning credences
to each of its elements, and P (h) = P (h | e&h) + P (h | ¬e&h), so weighting this partition
determines the posterior credence of h. Finally, since h is inconsistent with BIV it follows
that P
new
(BIV ) can’t be any higher than 1  P
new
(h), and so a high posterior credence in
h results in a low posterior credence in BIV , regardless of the prior credence in BIV . For
general remarks on this approach see [Je↵rey, 1983, 173].
19Assuming that P
old
(¬BIV ) > 0.
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The point of the Bayesian Argument is to show that Bayesianism is inconsis-
tent with the Dogmatist’s immediacy thesis by showing that an experience as
if h only generates a high posterior credence in h when the agent has a high
prior credence in e&¬h. I’ve argued that this conclusion follows only with
the additional thesis that upon having an experience as of h, Bayesian agents
ought to update on e and e alone. But updating on h instead of e (or in
addition to e) is both consistent with Bayesianism and much more natural for
the Dogmatist, and hence the Bayesian Argument is unsound.
One potential objection is that although adopting my proposal resolves
the apparent conflict between Bayesianism and the immediacy of perceptual
justification, it appears to create a new conflict between Bayesianism and the
underminability of perceptual justification.20 To see the problem, first consider
Classical Bayesianism*, the conjunction of Probabilism, Strict Conditionaliza-
tion, and the Ratio Analysis of conditional probability (we’ll back o↵ that
assumption in a moment):
Ratio Analysis: P (A | B) = P (A&B)
P (B)
The Ratio Analysis is important to the present discussion because it
commits the Bayesian to invincible certainty: if a proposition is once assigned
a credence of either 1 or 0 then it’s impossible to revise that credence en-
dogenously. If P (A) = 1, then P (A | B) = P (A&B)/P (B) = P (B)/P (B), meaning
20Thanks to Miriam Schoenfield for pressing this objection.
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that for any proposition B such that P (B) > 0, P (A | B) = 1. Similarly, if
P (A) = 0 then P (A | B) = P (A&B)/P (B) = 0/P (B) , and so for any proposition
B such that P (B) > 0, P (A | B) = 0.
Now for the problem. Since Classical Bayesianism* accepts Strict Con-
ditionalization, if that view is correct then in order to update on h I must
first exogenously revise P (h) to 1. The Dogmatist is committed to the un-
derminability of my credence in h and so it must be possible to decrease that
credence, but given Strict Conditionalization and the Ratio Analysis that’s im-
possible. The lesson is that the Classical Bayesian* can’t simultaneously hold
that (i) we should update on what we’re immediately justified in believing, (ii)
upon having a perceptual experience as of h I obtain some immediate justifica-
tion for believing that h, and (iii) my justification for h is underminable. The
Dogmatist is committed to (ii) and (iii), and my suggestion is that we accept
(i), so my response to the Bayesian Argument is unavailable to the Dogmatist
who is also a Classical Bayesian*.
What options are available to the Bayesian Dogmatist at this point?
Any Bayesian who accepts the Ratio Analysis is committed to the invinci-
bility of certainty: that boundary credences (0 or 1) can never be revised
endogenously. The Classical Bayesian*’s further commitment to Strict Condi-
tionalization forces them to assign a credence of 1 to any evidence proposition,
and hence the Classical Bayesian* is also committed to the invincibility of ev-
idence. Bayesianism is consistent with the rejection of either thesis, and each
holds the promise of yielding a version of Bayesianism that’s consistent with
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defeasible updates.21
Consider first what happens if we retain Strict Conditionalization and
Probabilism and give up on the Ratio Analysis of conditional probability. The
idea here is to accept the equation of P (A | B) with P (A&B)/P (B) in all instances
in which P (B) > 0 and to reject it otherwise (see Hájek [2003]).
Without the Ratio Analysis it’s possible to reduce some maximal cre-
dences, though only in a limited set of circumstances. Consider some proposi-
tion A that I’ve updated upon at some point in the past. Since we’re supposing
Strict Conditionalization, I must have assigned credence 1 to A when I up-
dated upon it. As we’ve seen, that means that for any proposition B such that
P (B)   0, P (A | B) = 1, and so it’s impossible to reduce my credence in A by
updating on B. But if we update on some proposition C such that P (C) = 0,
we are freed from the constraints of the Ratio Analysis and so there’s no formal
barrier to assigning P (A | C) a value less than 1. Hence for any proposition
A that we’ve previously updated upon and thus become certain is true, we
can back away from that certainty only by becoming certain of the truth of
some proposition C, which we formerly regarded as being certainly false, and
updating accordingly.
This is not an appealing way to accommodate undercutting defeat in
21A thorough discussion of the independent reasons to prefer Je↵rey Conditionalization
over Strict Conditionalization or to reject the Ration Analysis is beyond the scope of this
essay. My purpose in this section is instead to identify the version of Bayesianism most
amenable to Dogmatism. For broader criticism of the strictness of Strict Conditionalization
see [Je↵rey, 1983, ch. 11] and [Williamson, 2000, 203-7]; for a critique of the Ratio Analysis
see Hájek [2003].
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a Bayesian framework. Even after having an experience as of my hands and
updating accordingly it should be possible to increase my confidence in BIV
and on those grounds decrease my confidence in h. But if I’ve updated on h
and hence set P (h) = 1 then by Conditionalization I will also have set my
credence in every proposition inconsistent with h — including BIV — to 0.
But now how can I increase my credence in BIV from 0? As with all credence
revisions, that revision will be either exogenous or endogenous. Once I’ve set
P (BIV ) to 0, the only way to revise that value endogenously is to update on
some other proposition with a credence of 0.22 For example, if a very reliable
source were to tell me that I’m a brain in a vat after all then I should at least
slightly raise my confidence in BIV , but on the current proposal that’s only
possible if I assign a credence of zero to my obtaining that testimony.23
Can P (BIV ) be revised exogenously? That would be consistent with
the formalism, though I won’t comment on its plausibility. The problem that
I will mention is that given Strict Conditionalization, exogenously revising my
credence in BIV means assigning it a credence of 1, which means that upon
conditionalizing I must now revise my credence in h all the way back down to
22Because we’ve only rejected the Ratio Analysis in cases in which the proposition being
updated upon is assigned a credence of 0. If P (BIV ) = 0 and P (A) > 0 then we’re still
committed to saying that P (BIV | A) = P (A&B)/P (B)=0.
23Though I’ve been considering whether Hájek’s proposal of abandoning the Ratio Analy-
sis o↵ers a solution to the Problem of Invincible Evidence, Hájek himself was not motivated
by that problem. Hájek’s objection to the Ratio Analysis is that it makes it impossible
to update on propositions assigned a credence of 0. I’m sympathetic — I too ‘hold this
truth to be self-evident: the conditional probability of any (non-empty) proposition, given
itself, is 1’ [Hájek, 2003, 286] — so the criticisms in this section should not be interpreted
as criticisms of Hájek’s proposal.
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0, which is not what’s wanted in many cases of undermining.
Hence the combination of Dogmatism’s commitment to underminable
perceptual justification and Strict Conditionalization’s requirement that all
propositions being updated upon be assigned a credence of 1 is a poor match
for my proposal that the Bayesian Dogmatists should update on the contents
of experience. Classical Bayesianism and Je↵rey Bayesianism treat boundary
credences the same, and so Je↵rey Bayesians have no great advantage when
it comes to the defeasibility of credence 1 propositions. Nonetheless, Je↵rey
Bayesianism proves far more amenable to my proposal. For either type of
Bayesian, evidence is only invincible when it’s certain. Given Strict Condi-
tionalization, all evidence is certain and so all evidence is invincible (ignoring
the possibility of updating on P (·) = 0 propositions). Je↵rey Conditional-
ization allows updates on propositions that aren’t certain, and so evidence
needn’t be invincible. Hence the (Je↵rey) Bayesian Dogmatist is free to re-
spond to hand-like experience by exogenously revising their credence in h to
a value just below 1, thereby preserving its defeasibility.
The combination of Je↵rey Bayesianism and my proposal that we up-
date on the contents of our experience is very appealing. It allows the Dog-
matist to retain the core commitments of Bayesianism (Probabilism, a version
of Conditionalization, and the Ratio Analysis (if desired)) while avoiding the
problematic conclusion of the Bayesian Argument.
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1.6 Conclusion
The conclusion of the Bayesian argument has always been somewhat
surprising. Typically when two theories conflict it’s because they o↵er incon-
sistent accounts of the same explanandum. Bayesianism and Dogmatism seek
to account for di↵erent aspects of rationality: respectively, the coherence of
partial belief states and the appropriate response to perceptual experience.
Hence there is no single explanandum common to both theories. As I’ve ar-
gued, bringing those views into conflict requires an auxiliary account of how
they come into contact in the first place.
The success of the Bayesian argument requires a very specific thesis
about this point of contact between Dogmatism and Bayesianism: that upon
having an experience as of A the agent should exogenously revise their credence
in I’ve had an experience as if A, with any revision to their credence in A itself
proceeding via conditionalization. For Inferentialists that’s a very natural way
to model perceptual learning, as it makes explicit their view that perceptual
justification for A is inferentially dependent on agents having justification for
believing propositions about their own mental states. But Dogmatists reject
that inferential picture of perceptual justification, claiming instead that an
experience as of A can provide immediate justification for A. Hence the Dog-
matist should view the Inferentialist’s modeling proposal as both inaccurate
and prejudicial. In short, the Bayesian Argument together with the Inferen-
tialist’s approach to modeling begs the question the against the Dogmatist,
and the Bayesian Argument without that approach to modeling is unsound.
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Either way, the argument provides no reason to reject Dogmatism. The upshot
of these considerations is an attractive view combining Dogmatism and Je↵rey
Bayesianism, on which the epistemic impact of a perceptual experience is in-
corporated into the model by making rational an exogenous credence revision
to the content of that experience.
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Chapter 2
Updating, Undermining, and Perceptual
Learning
2.1 Introduction
On the way home from work I find myself wondering what color my
daughter’s new bike is. I think it might be blue, or red, or maybe green —
I’m not sure. I’m also not sure whether my colleague was joking when he
claimed to have slipped a (slow acting) color-hallucination-inducing drug in
my afternoon co↵ee. One thing I am sure about at this point is that facts
about my perceptual sobriety and facts about the color of my daughter’s bike
are evidentially unrelated: since I haven’t yet seen the bike, changing my
confidence in the one shouldn’t a↵ect my confidence in the other. Later I
see the bike, and since appears it to be green I become confident that it is
green. But something else has changed as well: now if I were to increase my
confidence that I’m on color-drugs, I would begin to doubt the veridicality
of my perceptual experience as of the greenness of the bike, and as a result
I would reduce my confidence that the bike is green. In other words, my
belief about whether I’m on color-drugs is no longer evidentially unrelated to
my belief about the color of the bike; the former now serves as a potential
defeater for the latter. In particular, it’s an undermining defeater: instead
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of telling directly against the truth of the bike is green, it tells against the
evidential support that I have for believing that proposition.
Jonathan Weisberg [2009], [2015] and Jim Pryor [2013] have argued
that the case as described is in tension with the Je↵rey Bayesian’s account
of perceptual learning. That’s because any two propositions that start out
probabilistically independent cannot lose that independence as a result of con-
ditionalizing on one of them. Conditionalization being the primary means of
rationally permissible credence revision in any Bayesian account of percep-
tual learning, and the loss of probabilisitic independence being essential to
at least some cases of undermining defeat, they conclude that undermining
defeat and Je↵rey Bayesianism are in tension or even inconsistent.1 In this
essay I argue that Weisberg’s and Pryor’s conclusion is overly pessimistic, and
that the Bayesian account of perceptual learning is perfectly consistent with
undermining defeat.
2.2 The Puzzle
I’ll begin with a quick sketch of the Bayesian account of perceptual
learning that I’ll be discussing. Agents assign subjective probabilities or cre-
dences to propositions (e.g. P (A)), with those assignments subject to norms
1Thought both Pryor’s and Weisberg’s written work supports this reading, in conversa-
tion they both take the lesson of the puzzle to be somewhat weaker: Weisberg takes it as a
reason to abandon subjective Bayesianism for an objective version that permits condition-
alization directly upon perceptual states, while Pryor takes the lesson to be very similar to
what I argue below. In this essay I’ll be responding to their written work.
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of probabilistic coherence (call that thesis ‘Probabilism’). Probabilities are
also assigned to propositions conditional on other propositions (e.g. P (A|B)),
which for our purposes I’ll understand as being defined in terms of uncondi-





experience leads agents to revise some subset of their credences, which by a
process of Bayesian Conditionalization leads to revisions in other credences.
Bayesians understand the process of conditionalization in slightly dif-
ferent ways. According to Classical Bayesians, upon changing credence in B
to 1 (due to a perceptual experience, or whatever) the agent updates by set-
ting her new credence in A to her old credence in: A conditional on B. In
other words, where P
old
(.) is the probability function accepted by the agent
before having the relevant perceptual experience and P
new
(.) is the function
accepted by the agent after having the experience and updating on B, Classical






Je↵rey Bayesians2 generalize the Classical program by relaxing the re-
quirement that all conditionalization be on propositions assigned a credence
of 1. I’ll go into more detail about how Je↵rey conditionalization works below,
2For the purposes of this essay a Je↵rey Bayesian is any Bayesian who accepts Richard
Je↵rey’s generalization of the classical rule of conditionalization that I’m calling ‘Je↵rey
Conditionalization’. Our ‘Je↵rey Bayesians’ needn’t share Richard Je↵rey’s particular views
about the motivations for accepting that rule (Je↵rey [1992])), Radical Probabilism (Je↵rey
[2004]) or anything else.
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but here’s a rough sketch: the process begins with an assignment of credences
to some subset of the propositions to which the agent assigns credences. These
credence assignments are laundered (see below) into a partition of the agent’s
state space, in which that space is divided into an exhaustive and exclusive set
of ways that the world might be (the ‘elements’ of the partition), with each
way assigned a credence. Finally, the agent conditionalizes on this partition
with its weighted elements — call them the B
i















With these preliminaries in place, let’s return to the puzzle of the color-
drugs and the bike. Before seeing the bike I regarded the veridicality of my
own color perception as irrelevant to the greenness of the bike, and hence I
regarded the propositions I’m on color-drugs and the bike is green as being
probabilistically independent. Taking P
old
(·) as the probability function that I




(green | color-drugs) = P
old
(green)
After I’ve had an experience as of the bike being green and shifted my
partition accordingly, I adopt the credence function P
new
(·) that results from
the relevant conditionalization procedure. At this point I no longer regard the
two propositions as being independent, but instead regard I’m on color-drugs




(green | color-drugs) < P
new
(green)
Weisberg and Pryor observe that the introduction of a negative prob-
abilistic correlation between two propositions through a process of updating
on one of them is problematic within the Bayesian framework. That’s because
Je↵rey Conditionalization is rigid:3
Je↵rey Rigidity: If P
new
(·) is the credence function resulting from accepting
P
old
(·) and then updating on a shift in partition {B
i
}, then for any













and rigid updating rules preserve independence:4,5

































Hence Weisberg’s puzzle, as I’ll call it, is this: our intuitions about
undermining defeaters commit us to both (1) and (2), but if learning from an
3See Je↵rey [1992, p. 80] and Weisberg [2015, p. 125].
4See Weisberg [2015, p. 126]. For the Classical versions of the Rigidity and RIP principles
take the partition to consist of a single cell weighted to 1.
5The independence-preserving nature of rigid update rules also creates problems for what
we might call ‘promoters’. My confidence that the bike is green might be very high after
an experience as of its greenness, and then become higher still when I learn that I’m on
drugs that make my color-perception especially reliable. This would require that my new
credence function include a positive correlation between those propositions, which cannot be
introduced via a rigid updating rule (assuming that were independent before the experience).
Thanks to an anonymous referee for pointing this out.
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experience as of a green bike involves updating on the bike is green using a
rigid updating rule such as Je↵rey Conditionalization, then that combination
is impossible.6,7 As Weisberg puts it, “...[perceptual underminers are] irrele-
vant to the supported proposition at first, but negatively relevant after the
perceptual state has lent its support. And this is precisely what ‘Rigidity
is Independence Preserving’ rules out. If the underminer is irrelevant before
the perceptual state supports the proposition, it is irrelevant after as well.
So Rigidity prevents perceptual undermining when it obviously shouldn’t.”
6One could model the undermining e↵ect of I’m on color-drugs on the bike is green by
updating instead on something like it appears as if the bike is green, which in turn raises my
credence in the bike is green only if I already have a low credence in I’m on color-drugs. This
allows us to regard anything that raises that last credence as an undermining defeater for
the greenness of the bike; in the language of Pryor [2013] this could be modeled as a case of
‘quotidian’ undermining. This is beside the point. Weisberg’s puzzle presents a problem for
anyone who thinks that the propositions conditionalized upon — whatever those happen to
be — can themselves be undermined, and so updating upon beliefs about how things seem
o↵ers a solution only if we agree that (i) those beliefs cannot be undermined, and (ii) all
cases of undermining defeat are quotidian. An evaluation of that approach is outside of the
scope of this essay – I’ll be arguing that the Bayesian has a solution to Weisberg’s puzzle
requiring neither indefeasible updates nor pan-quotidianism about undermining defeat.
7Note the conditional structure of the preceding sentence. An alternative possibility is
that episodes of perceptual learning that seem to require failures of Rigidity are simply
inapt to be modeled using Je↵rey Conditionalization. Je↵rey thought of Rigidity not as
feature of Conditionalization, but as a precondition for that rule’s applicability (see [Je↵rey,
1970, 172-9]). Since what I learn from my experience as of the greenness of the bike is
vulnerable to undermining defeat, this case seems to require just such a failure of Rigidity,
and so in this case the precondition is not satisfied and Je↵rey Conditionalization does not
apply. Weisberg implicitly rejects this picture, proceeding as if Je↵rey Conditionalization
either must apply in every case of perceptual learning or it must be rejected. Since Jef-
frey Conditionalization is rigid, he reasons, it doesn’t apply to cases of perceptual learning
that are vulnerable to undermining defeat, so it doesn’t apply to every case, so it must
be rejected. (For more on this dispute, see §2.5.) I argue that neither side has it quite
right: pace Je↵rey, Conditionalization applies in all cases of perceptual learning, and Pace
Weisberg, this needn’t lead to Rigidity failures, so this creates no significant problem for
Je↵rey Conditionalization.
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[Weisberg, 2015, p. 126]
2.3 Bayesian Learning More Carefully
Below I’ll be arguing that Weisberg’s conclusion is too strong, but in
order to do so we must first take a closer look at Bayesian perceptual learning
and the ways that it’s constrained by Rigidity.
2.3.1 Bayesianism is Incomplete
Bayesianism is at best an incomplete theory of epistemology, in the
sense that there are at least two very important varieties of constraints upon
rational credence assignments that it is unable to explain. The first variety
of incompleteness concerns rationally permissible starting credence functions,
functions held by agents who possess no evidence at all (so-called ‘super-
babies’). There are many intuitively impermissible starting credence func-
tions that are nonetheless perfectly consistent with Probabilism, and hence
whose impermissibility cannot be explained by anything within the Bayesian
formalism. An agent’s choice of starting credence function will of course de-
termine how perceptually acquired information is to a↵ect other credences via
conditionalization, as it will determine their conditional probabilities.
I’ll return to the significance of the Bayesian formalism’s underdetermi-
nation of rationally permissible starting credence functions in §2.5, but right
now I want to focus on another type of incompleteness in the Bayesian account
of perceptual learning. Just as Probabilism alone is too weak to rule out all
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of the intuitively impermissible starting credence functions, Conditionaliza-
tion is too weak to rule out all intuitively impermissible credence revisions.
That’s because not all permissible credence revisions proceed via Conditional-
ization, and those that don’t are only minimally constrained by the Bayesian
formalism.
The most important credence revisions that don’t proceed via condi-
tionalization come as a result of a perceptual experience. Why am I rational in
believing that the stove is warm? Because it feels warm. Why am I rational in
believing that the cat is on the mat? Because I had a perceptual experience as
of a cat on the mat. Those experiences make it rationally permissible to form
those beliefs.8 On the sort of subjective Bayesian picture that we’re consider-
ing, probabilities are understood as partial belief states, and the only sorts of
things that can be partially believed are propositions. Experiences as of warm
stoves or cats on mats might have propositional content (I think that they
do), but they are not themselves propositions and so they cannot be assigned
credences. Hence they are not the sorts of things that can be conditionalized
upon. Hence Conditionalization cannot be the whole story when it comes to
rationally permissible credence revisions.9
8For those who prefer a picture on which agents update on propositions about how things
seem rather than how things are, the question becomes: why am I rational in believing I’ve
had an experience as of a cat on the mat? The answer is the same: because of my experience.
9Note how minimal I’ve been in describing the role of experience in fostering rationally
permissible credence revision. The point applies not only to those (such as myself) who
think that a perceptual experience can be evidence that justifies belief, but also to those
who think that it can play only a non-evidential, non-justificatory role in making certain
beliefs or credence revisions rationally permissible (e.g. Davidson, Je↵rey, and Williamson).
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Bayesians construct formal models of rationally permissible credence
revisions, and all of the revisions that they model proceed via conditional-
ization. As we’ve seen, many rationally permissible credence revisions do not
proceed via conditionalization and hence not all rationally permissible credence
revisions are modeled. This distinction will be important to what follows, so
I’ll introduce some terminology: call the revisions modeled by the Bayesian
endogenous credence revisions (as in endogenous to the model), and call the
rest exogenous revisions.10
2.3.2 Rigidity and Independence, Carefully This Time
With the distinction between endogenous and exogenous revisions in
mind, let’s take a closer look at the rigidity of Conditionalization. To that end
(and I swear this is relevant) note that it’s common for a single perceptual
experience to a↵ect one’s rational confidence in many di↵erent propositions.
For example, if I have a perceptual experience as of a red, spherical ball, I
might shift my confidence in the ball is red and the ball is spherical, along
with lots of other propositions (experience is pretty rich, after all). Though
the details of how to model this phenomenon will di↵er slightly on the Je↵rey
and the Classical Bayesian accounts, they share some important similarities,
and in both cases those details have important implications for the rigidity of
Bayesian perceptual learning.
Consider first how the Classical Bayesian will model a case in which
10See [BLIND]; the terminology originates with Howson and Urbach [1993, p. 82].
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an agent exogenously revises her credence in more than one proposition at a
time. At t
1
Clara accepts a credence function such that P
t1(A) = Pt1(B) =
P
t1(A|B) = .5, and then at t2 she exogenously shifts her credences in A to 1 and
in B to 1. As discussed above, this exogenous shift alone will fix some subset of
her credences at t
2
— in this case that set will include her credences in A and
in B — with others being determined by conditionalizing upon that subset.
But what exactly does it mean to update not on a single proposition, but on
a set of propositions? For the Classical Bayesian, the answer is very simple:
update on all of the new evidence acquired by updating on the conjunction of
all of the propositions whose probabilities have just been exogenously revised
to 1, which in this case means updating on A&B.
Classical conditionalization is rigid, meaning that updating on A&B
never changes the probability of any other proposition conditional on A&B.
Importantly, though, conditionalizing on that conjunction will not in every
case preserve the probability of some proposition C conditional on one of the
conjuncts of that conjunction, i.e. P (C|A) or P (C|B). Suppose for reductio
that that’s false, and so for any A, B and C, P (C|A) = P
A&B
(C|A). No





(C|A&B); after all, at that point I’ve assigned
a credence of 1 both to A and to A&B. The rigidity of Conditionalization
ensures that P
A&B
(C|A&B) = P (C|A&B), and so given our supposition it
follows that P (C|A) = P (C|A&B) for any A, B and C. But this last equality
is often false — my credence that the table is delicate given that it’s made
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out of glass is much higher than my credence that it’s delicate given that it’s
made out of glass and it’s incredibly sturdy — and so our supposition is false.
The lesson so far isn’t that Classical Conditionalization isn’t rigid; it
is. The two-part lesson is that (i) the proposition that’s conditionalized upon
might be just one of the many propositions that are exogenously revised, and
(ii) though Classical Conditionalization is rigid with respect to the one propo-
sition that’s conditionalized upon, it’s not rigid with respect to those other
exogenously revised propositions.
Having appreciated both (i) and (ii) we’re now in a position to sketch
a possible response to Weisberg’s puzzle. As far as that puzzle goes, Rigid-
ity is only interesting because rigid updates preserve independence between
the proposition updated upon and other propositions. This is puzzling only
if we assume that the propositions losing their independence with potential
underminers are the ones that we update upon directly, rather than conjuncts
in a larger conjunctive proposition that we update upon. If we drop that as-
sumption, then we are free to concede the rigidity of Conditionalization with-
out thereby conceding that Conditionalization preserves the independence of
exogenously revised, perceptually justified propositions with their potential
underminers.
Below I’ll develop this response on behalf of the Je↵rey conditionalizer,
but first let’s note that it’s hopeless for the Classical conditionalizer. The case
here is overdetermined, but I’ll mention just one reason that’s particularly
salient to our discussion. Classically conditionalizing upon A&B requires as-
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signing assigning it a credence of 1, which requires assigning A a credence of 1.
But any proposition assigned a credence of 1 is probabilistically independent of
any other proposition11, and so any proposition that’s been updated upon, or
any of their logical implications, will be independent of all other propositions.
It follows that if A and C are independent before I Classically conditionalize
on A&B, then they’ll be independent afterward. Hence while Classically con-
ditionalizing on A&B can change credences conditional on A or on B, it can’t
destroy the independence of A or B with some other proposition.
Je↵rey conditionalization avoids this particular problem by allowing
updates on propositions with credences less than 1. For example, Je↵rey
Bayesianism describes how to conditionalize when an experience makes it ra-
tionally permissible to exogenously revise my credence in the ball is red to .7
and my credence in the ball is spherical to .9. But this creates a new prob-
lem: while the Classical Bayesian can handle cases of multiple propositions
whose credences have been revised exogenously by conditionalizing on their
conjunction, in most cases this move is unavailable to the Je↵rey Bayesian. A
probability assignment of 1 to each conjunct ensures that the probability of the
conjunction will be 1 as well, but assignments of probabilities between 0 and 1
to both conjuncts is consistent with a range of probability assignments to their
conjunction. For example, if I think that P (red) = .7 and P (spherical) = .9,
the value of P (red & spherical) can be anywhere between .6 and .7, and where
in that interval the probability of that conjunction lies is undetermined by the
11Assuming that the propositions in question have credences greater than zero.
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probabilities of the conjuncts themselves.
Je↵rey conditionalizers face a second complication in selecting what to
conditionalize upon. While Classical Bayesians update on a weighted propo-
sition,12 Je↵rey Bayesians update on a weighted partition of the state space,
where a partition is simply a division of that space into mutually exclusive and
jointly exhaustive parts, each weighted according to its probability. Proposi-
tions such as the ball is red and the ball is spherical are neither exclusive
nor exhaustive, and so they typically won’t partition the relevant state space
(though they might: see fn. 13).
Je↵rey [1983, p. 173] resolves the issue in a very simple way. He begins
by identifying an initial set of propositions — he calls them ‘originating propo-
sitions’ — whose probabilities shift exogenously, but which typically are not
elements of the partition. Those elements are instead conjunctions constructed
by taking each originating proposition or its negation as a conjunct. For ex-
ample, taking A and B as our originating propositions we wind up with four
conjunctions as our partition elements: A&B, A&¬B, ¬A&B and ¬A&¬B.
These four conjunctions (Je↵rey calls them ‘atoms’; I’ll follow more recent
authors and call them ‘elements’) are mutually exclusive and jointly exhaust





} will form a partition, allowing us to Je↵rey conditionalize upon it.13
12This is slightly misleading — see fn. 13.
13Many authors — Weisberg and Pryor included — omit this aspect of Je↵rey’s theory
in their summaries. I speculate that this is because in certain circumstances the e↵ect of
updating on the originating propositions and updating on the elements is the same, and
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With all of this in mind, let’s revisit Rigidity with an eye to clarifying
precisely what’s rigid with respect to what on the Je↵rey picture. Recall that
Rigidity says:
Je↵rey Rigidity If P
new
(·) is the credence function resulting from accepting
P
old
(·) and then updating on a shift in partition {B
i
}, then for any

















} is a conjunction of originating
propositions, not an originating proposition itself. Hence what Je↵rey Rigidity
rules out is a change in conditional probabilities on conjunctions of originat-
ing propositions, not changes in conditional probabilities on the originating
propositions themselves. As with Classical conditionalization, the probabili-
ties of the individual conjuncts — the originating propositions — conditional
on other propositions will not be so-constrained.
because Je↵rey’s most widely discussed example of how his system works just happens to
be one of those circumstances. In the example we are asked to imagine seeing a cloth in poor
lighting, which results results in exogenous revisions to the probabilities of the cloth is green
(=G), the cloth is blue (=B) and the cloth is violet (=V). Strictly speaking, this should
lead to an update on a partition whose elements include the eight (= 23) conjunctions that
we can construct from those three originating propositions, yet Je↵rey (together with many
later authors discussing this example) omits discussion of the conjunctions and simply talks
of updating on these three propositions. The reason that this isn’t disastrous in the current
case is because we’re asked to also suppose that the agent seeing the cloth is already certain
that nothing is more than one color (all over, at the same time, etc) and is also certain that
the cloth is either green, blue or violet. Given those suppositions the probability of five of
our eight conjunctions is zero, and so they can safely be ignored as elements of the partition.
The three remaining conjunctions will each be closely identified with one of our originating
propositions: the cloth is green with G&¬B&¬V , the cloth is blue with ¬G&B&¬V , and
the cloth is violet with ¬G&¬B&V . Given the particulars of the case it’s harmless to speak
of updating on a partition with elements G,B, and V , but since those particulars will not
generally obtain this harmlessness does not generalize.
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Consider again my perceptual experience as of the red, spherical ball.
Before that experience I assigned a probability of .5 to each proposition, and I
assign P
old
(red | spherical) = .5. Upon having that experience I set P
new
(red)
to .7 and P
new
(spherical) to .9. Since those originating propositions don’t form
a partition, I now need to assign credences to the four relevant conjunctions.
Suppose that I do so as follows:
P
new
(red & spherical) = .6
P
new
(red & ¬(spherical)) = .1
P
new
(¬(red) & spherical) = .3
P
new
(¬(red) & ¬(spherical)) = 0
Now my credence in P
new
(red | spherical) = 2/3. We therefore have a
case analogous to the one observed above: we have an episode of perceptual
learning in which the probability of an originating proposition on something
else has changed, all while respecting the rigidity of Je↵rey conditionalization.
That’s the first lesson of this example. The second lesson is actually
a bit more interesting. The exogenously revised values that I assigned to my
two originating propositions constrain the values that I assign to the elements
of my partition — to my four conjunctions — but do not determine them
completely. Since (i) the probability of the ball is red conditional on the ball is
spherical is by definition (we are supposing) the ratio of their conjunction to
the unconditional probability of the ball is red, and (ii) the probabilities of two
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propositions underdetermines the probability of their conjunction, it follows
that (iii) assigning probabilities to two originating propositions (sometimes)
underdetermines the probability of one of them conditional on the other. For
example, I might just as easily have assigned the following credences after my
observation of the red, spherical ball:
P
new
⇤ (red & spherical) = .7
P
new
⇤ (red & ¬(spherical)) = 0
P
new
⇤ (¬(red) & spherical) = .2
P
new
⇤ (¬(red) & ¬(spherical)) = .1
In that case my credence in P
new
⇤ (red | spherical) = 7/9, yet just as before my
credences in the ball is red and the ball is spherical are .7 and .9, respectively.
The probabilities assigned exogenously to originating propositions are
only minimally constrained by the Bayesian formalism. As we now see, even
once those probabilities are selected the probability of their conjunction is
underdetermined, and hence the probability of one originating proposition
conditional upon another is also underdetermined. It’s frequently the case that
experience makes it rationally permissible to revise the probabilities of several
originating propositions at once, and as a result it’s frequently necessary for
agents to go further and determine the values of their conjunctions in order to
form the partition required for updating. The upshot, then, is that perceptual
learning as understood by the Je↵rey Bayesian e↵ectively involves changes to
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conditional probabilities that are unmediated by Je↵rey conditionalization and
hence are unconstrained by Rigidity.
We’re now in a position to draw a broader lesson regarding the signif-
icance of the rigidity of Conditionalization for Bayesian perceptual learning.
Episodes of perceptual learning involve an exogenous assignment of credences
to some propositions (as a result of an experience or something else) and also
an endogenous assignment of credences (via Conditionalization) to others. The
endogenous assignments reflect the bearing of the exogenously set credences
upon the rest.
Weisberg correctly points out that the rigidity of conditionalization
prevents the introduction of probabilistic entanglement between the bike is
green and I’m on color-drugs via conditionalization. But the intuition driving
Weisberg’s Puzzle is not that the probabilistic entanglement is introduced via
conditionalization, but merely that it’s one result of my perceptual experience.
As we’ve seen, the Bayesian account of perceptual learning involves
more than just Conditionalization: it also involves exogenous credence revi-
sions that don’t proceed via Conditionalization. Moreover, those exogenous
revisions commonly result in changes to the probability of one originating
proposition conditional upon another, as we saw in the case of the red, spher-
ical ball. Finally, even once the exogenously set unconditional probabilities of
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our originating propositions are determined, there’s considerable flexibility in
setting their new conditional probabilities.
2.4 Formal Proposal
My proposed response to Weisberg’s puzzle is fairly simple. Intuitively,
having a perceptual experience as of the greenness of my daughter’s bike should
result in (i) an increase in my confidence in the bike is green, (ii) no change to
my confidence in I’m on color-drugs, and (iii) the introduction of a negative
correlation between I’m on color-drugs and the bike is green, i.e. it should now
be the case that P
new
(green | color-drugs) < P
new
( green). Rigidity prevents
the introduction of this negative correlation endogenously via conditionaliza-
tion on a partition that includes the bike is green as an element, and so it
must not be an element of the partition. Assuming that my confidence in that
proposition is to be increased exogenously, the introduction of the negative
correlation in (iii) requires that my new credence in both the bike is green
and I’m on color-drugs must be among the conjuncts of the elements of the
input partition. Hence what must happen is that my credence in both of those
propositions must be set exogenously.
I’ll defend this proposal in §2.5, but for now let’s just get a sense for
how it works out formally. We take as our originating propositions the bike is
green (=G) and I’m on color-drugs (=D), and hence we partition our state
space into four elements, correlating with the four possible combinations of
those propositions and their negations. For simplicity assume that each of the
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four elements starts out with a probability of 1/4. The introduction of the










Figure 2.1: Introduction of negative correlation between D (= I’m on color
drugs) and G (= the bike is green).
Here my confidence that I was on color drugs when I had my perceptual
experience as of the green bike hasn’t changed, and my confidence that the
bike is green has increased. If we suppose that I’m on color-drugs is a complete
undermining defeater — a defeater that deprives the perceptual experience of
all of its evidential force — then if I were to become certain that I was on color
drugs, then my epistemic situation vis-à-vis the bike is green before I had the
perceptual experience should be the same as my situation after having the













Figure 2.2: Becoming certain of a full undermining defeater.
If at t
3
I become more confident that I was on color drugs without














Figure 2.3: Increased confidence in a full undermining defeater.
What if instead of varying my degree of confidence in a full undermining
defeater, we vary the degree to which G is undermined? For example, suppose
that the color-drugs only somewhat decrease the reliability of my color per-
ception, so that D is a partial undermining defeater. This will be set at that
initial exogenous revision in response to the experience. The particular mech-
anism will be that it will increase the size of the D&G space at the expense of
the ¬D&G space, where a greater increase means a weaker undermining e↵ect.
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Assuming that this doesn’t reduce my new (at t
2
) credence of G, that means
that the ratio of ¬D&G to ¬D&¬G will decrease sightly. If my confidence in
D increases at t
3














Figure 2.4: Uncertainty in a partial undermining defeater.
2.5 Defending the Proposal
Weisberg’s puzzle illustrates that the introduction of a negative proba-
bilistic correlation between an originating proposition and its potential under-
mining defeater cannot be modeled within the Bayesian formalism. Weisberg
takes this to be a reason to reject Bayesianism. I have proposed instead that it
is a reason to move the introduction of that correlation outside of the model, so
that it is already achieved once Conditionalization is applied to the partition.
I’ve shown that this is consistent with Je↵rey Bayesianism, which already as-
sumed the existence of credence revisions taking place o↵-model (exogenous
revisions) that can change conditional probabilities on propositions involved
in those o↵-model revisions, and so includes a formal mechanism for incorpo-
rating those revisions into the model.
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Weisberg [2015, p. 142-5] anticipates this type of response, calling it
the ‘appeal to richer inputs’, and raises two objections. His first objection
is that my proposal requires input partitions that are far more complex than
the simple four or eight cell partitions that I’ve diagramed in §2.4. After all,
there are lots and lots of potential underminers for instances of perceptual
learning, and each of them will need to become negatively correlated with the
proposition that they have the potential to defeat. On my proposal each of
those propositions will need to be treated as an originating proposition, and
as a result the input partitions will be fairly fine-grained. Moreover, because
the determination of which fine-grained partition to adopt given a particular
experience will take place outside of the formal model, my proposal involves a
loss of explanatory power for Bayesianism. I’ll return to this objection below.
More troubling to Weisberg than a mere loss of explanatory power is
exactly what is being left unexplained:
An update rule is supposed to determine our new credences as a
function of our old beliefs and the new evidence. But on the cur-
rent proposal, “the new evidence” is not really the new evidence.
The complex distribution we would be plugging into Je↵rey condi-
tionalization would be produced by considering how an experience
as of a red-looking sock and our background beliefs about optics
combine to warrant new beliefs about the quality of the air and
the colour of the sock. And this is precisely the kind of work our
update rule was supposed to do. (ibid. 144)
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This second objection to my proposal can be interpreted in two ways,
each of which amounts to (i) a proposed criterion of adequacy for any update
rule, and (ii) the claim that if my proposal is accepted, then Conditionalization
does not satisfy this proposed criterion. In each case I’ll just grant (ii), and
instead argue that (i) is not a criterion that Conditionalization needs to satisfy.
I’ll be assuming that Weisberg is objecting to ‘the current proposal’ in partic-
ular, rather that Bayesianism as such. Given that assumption, if Weisberg’s
objection successful, then he must have identified some problem for Je↵rey
Conditionalization together with my proposal that does not arise for Je↵rey
Conditionalization alone. I argue that there is no such problem, and hence if
Je↵rey Conditionalization is broadly acceptable as an update rule, then so is
Je↵rey Conditionalization together with my proposed constraint upon input
partitions.
The two interpretations of Weisberg’s criterion are distinguished by
what we take the ‘new evidence’ to be. Like Weisberg, I think that perceptual
experience is one type of evidence. This suggests an interpretation of Weis-
berg’s criterion on which any adequate update rule must take experiences and
old beliefs as inputs and determine new beliefs as outputs. The problem with
Weisberg’s criterion so-interpreted is that the ‘kind of work’ that’s being de-
manded of Conditionalization is one that no Bayesian update rule — Classical
or Je↵rey, with my proposal or without — is capable of doing.
The problem is that perceptual experience is the wrong sort of thing
to be conditionalizing upon. As discussed in §2.3.1, only endogenous credence
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revisions are governed by a Bayesian update rule, and the only thing that can
spark an endogenous revision is an exogenously revised credence. Having a
perceptual experience and exogenously revising a credence are two very di↵er-
ent things,14 and hence we never conditionalize upon perceptual evidence. It
follows that if the adequacy of an update rule demands that it take us from
‘old beliefs and... new evidence’ (in the form of an experience) to a new cre-
dence function, then Je↵rey conditionalization is not an adequate update rule.
It thus becomes clear that Weisberg is objecting to Je↵rey Conditionalization
as such, which contradicts my original assumption that Weisberg is taking aim
the current proposal in particular.
Some authors deny that experience can serve as evidence. Taking inspi-
ration from Davidson [1986, p. 311], Richard Je↵rey [1983, p. 184-5, 211] holds
that only a belief can justify a belief (i.e. can be evidence), and since experi-
ences aren’t beliefs it follows that experiences can’t be evidence. On his (and
Davidson’s) view, experience may cause credences to shift, but those shifts are
inapt for rational evaluation and hence not within the purview of epistemol-
ogy. Williamson [2000, p. 197-200] thinks something very similar: though only
known propositions count as evidence, some propositions are known because
(yes, that’s his term) of the agent’s experiences, which are not themselves
evidence.
If all evidence is propositional, then my objection to Weisberg’s crite-
14See Plantinga [1993, p. 82-3].
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rion (first interpretation) of adequacy for an update rule is moot, as Condi-
tionalization is now capable of taking agents from old beliefs and new (propo-
sitional) evidence to new credences. But this response is inconsistent with the
spirit of the criterion, which seems to be that an update rule should model
the epistemic significance of experiences, whether or not we label those expe-
riences ‘evidence’; this is something that Conditionalization cannot do. For
Davidson and Je↵rey, note that two agents with identical beliefs/ credence
functions might not be rationally alike, as one might have some beliefs caused
by a perceptual experience, and hence capable of justifying other beliefs, while
the other has beliefs with some other causal origin; one agent possesses propo-
sitional evidence that the other agent lacks. On this view the epistemic dif-
ference between the two agents can’t be explained without accounting for the
etiology their beliefs, which will require an account of the relationship between
propositions and experiences — between propositions and non-propositions —
something Bayesians cannot do within their formal model. Hence even for
someone with Je↵rey-like views on perceptual justification, conditionalization
cannot satisfy the spirit of Weisberg’s criterion.15
Williamson’s views are a bit more complicated. Whereas for Je↵rey
beliefs caused by experience can be evidence for other propositions, Williamson
thinks that only knowledge plays that role. If Je↵rey is right, then we can hold
the initial beliefs fixed while changing the epistemic status of inferred beliefs
15I don’t mean to suggest that Je↵rey himself ever thought that it could do something
like that; he didn’t. I want simply to dispense with the notion that adopting Je↵rey’s views
on evidence renders conditionalization consistent with Weisberg’s criterion.
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by changing the etiology of those initial beliefs. But if it’s knowledge that
serves this evidential role, then that same trick won’t work, at least not given
the rest of Williamson’s view. Williamson thinks that evidential relations are
objective relations between propositions: input a set of evidence propositions
(the ones that the agent knows) into their credence function and out comes
the probability that ought be assigned to every other proposition (op. cit.
§10.2). Against Bayesians he claims that this probability function itself (in
contrast to its inputs) is eternal/ insensitive to the beliefs of the agent. On
this view it really doesn’t matter why or on what grounds the agent knows
evidence proposition A, only that it is known.
Nonetheless, Williamson’s update rule is also inconsistent with the
spirit of Weisberg’s criterion. After all, the epistemologist will still want to
know why, in virtue of what, particular agents have the evidence that they
do in fact have/ know the things that they know non-inferentially. In some
cases the agent will know that A in virtue of their experiences. The epis-
temological significance of experience does not disappear simply because we
stop calling it ‘evidence’. (As above, I don’t mean to suggest that Williamson
thinks otherwise.)
On the first interpretation of Weisberg’s criterion, the objection is that
if my proposal is accepted, then the inputs to Je↵rey conditionalization cannot
include new experiential evidence, and hence that that rule cannot ‘determine
our new credences as a function of our old beliefs and the new [perceptual]
evidence’. I’ve argued that that’s a feature of every version of Bayesian con-
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ditionalization, and hence that it’s not a special problem for my proposal.
On the second interpretation of Weisberg’s criterion, the complaint is
not that my proposal requires updates on partitions rather than experiences,
but that the partitions that my proposal requires are defective, and that this
defect is not shared by versions of Je↵rey Conditionalization that do not adopt
my proposal. This putative defect is not formal; formally speaking Je↵rey
Conditionalization can take any weighted partition of the agent’s old beliefs
as an input. Instead the objection seems to be couched in a specific idea about
the role that an update rule should play in a complete theory of perceptual
learning.
A complete theory of perceptual learning would be one that satisfies
the first interpretation of Weisberg’s criterion: it would determine new beliefs






Figure 2.5: The form of a complete theory of perceptual learning.







Figure 2.6: The form Je↵rey Conditionalization.
If Je↵rey conditionalization is to have any role to play in a complete the-
ory of perceptual learning, then there must be a part of that theory that spells
out how experiences determine the inputs to conditionalization: weighted par-
titions. Hence any complete theory of perceptual justification that is broadly
Bayesian in nature will consist in two distinct update rules: a heretofore un-
known rule that determines a weighted partition from the experience (possibly
together with old beliefs – more on this below), and conditionalization, which
determines new beliefs as a function of old beliefs plus that partition. The









Figure 2.7: The form of a broadly Bayesian theory of perceptual learning.
We’re now in a position to begin fleshing out the second interpretation
of Weisberg’s criterion. The question turns on the role of old beliefs in de-
termining the weighted partitions that agents update upon. When Weisberg
objects to partitions determined by ‘considering how an experience as of a
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red-looking sock and our background beliefs about optics combine to warrant
new beliefs about the quality of the air and the color of the sock’ because ‘this
is precisely the sort of work that our update rule was supposed to do’, he’s
suggesting that background beliefs should not play a role in partition deter-
mination. Instead the partition should be identified with the direct epistemic
e↵ects of the experience, i.e. those credence revisions that are unmediated by
background beliefs.
My proposal does not satisfy this version of Weisberg’s criterion because
it requires that some propositions that are not directly a↵ected by experience
appear in the partition as originating propositions: the undermining defeaters
for the other originating propositions in that partition. On my proposal, if my
experience as of the red, spherical ball leads me to increase my confidence in
the ball is red and also come to regard I’m on color-drugs as an undermining
defeater for that proposition, then both of those propositions must appear in
the partition as originating propositions. But it will not generally be the case
that such an experience will directly a↵ect my beliefs about my own color-
sobriety, so the partition is underdetermined by those direct e↵ects.
As before, however, this version of Weisberg’s criterion amounts to a
general indictment of Je↵rey conditionalization rather than of my proposal in
particular. The general problem is that in very many cases, at least some of
the agent’s posterior credences will be determined neither by the experience
alone — they will not be among the direct e↵ects of the experience — nor by
conditionalizing upon those direct e↵ects. As a result, some indirect e↵ects of
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experience will be determined exogenously, so Je↵rey conditionalization will
fail to do the ‘kind of work’ that Weisberg’s criterion (second interpretation)
demands of any adequate update rule.
To illustrate, suppose that we reject my proposal and retain Je↵rey
Conditionalization. Plausibly, among the direct e↵ects of my experience as
of the red, spherical ball are an increased credence in the ball is red and an
increased credence in the ball is spherical, and so presumably those proposi-
tions will be among the originating propositions in my partition. Supposing
further that these are the only relevant originating propositions, the partition
will contain four conjunctions as elements: red & spherical, red & ¬spherical,
¬red & spherical, ¬red & ¬spherical. That means that my credence in each of
those conjunctions will be revised exogenously, i.e. not via conditionalization.
Is it plausible to claim that my credence in each of those conjunctions is
in every case determined solely by experience, with no input from background
beliefs? I’m inclined to say no, and my inclination only strengthens once
we drop the simplifying supposition that our conjunctive partition elements
are composed of only two conjuncts each. For in addition to appearing red
and spherical, the ball might appear to be dirty, punctured, and three feet to
the left of the tree,16 in which case our partition elements have at least five
conjuncts. I feel no inclination to say that my credence in the following is
a direct e↵ect of my experience: red & ¬spherical & ¬dirty & punctured &
16There’s no reason to stop at five ways that he ball might appear; experience is pretty
rich, after all.
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¬three feet to the left of the tree.17
One more example to drive the point home. By the definition of condi-
tional probability, once P (A&B) and P (¬A&B) are determined, so is P (A|B).
That means that if both A and B are originating propositions in an exoge-
nously determined partition, then once the weighted elements of that partition
are determined, the probabilities of each originating proposition conditional on
every other originating proposition are determined as well. For example, the
partition described in the previous paragraph would determine my credence
that the ball is not red given that it’s punctured, and also my credence that
it’s dirty and not three feet to the left of the tree given that it’s not spheri-
cal. As before, I feel no inclination to say that these credences are among the
direct e↵ects of my experiences, and yet they aren’t determined via condition-
alization either. Hence even without my proposal, it’s not plausible that the
input partitions required by Je↵rey conditionalization are determined entirely
by experience.
I have proposed that the best way for Bayesians to accommodate the
phenomenon of perceptual learning that is itself vulnerable to undermining
defeat is to include potential undermining defeaters among the originating
propositions of the input partition, and hence to determine the negative cor-
relation between defeater and new belief exogenously. The identity of and
17To be clear: the issue is whether my credence in the conjunction is determined by
experience alone, not whether my credence in each conjunct is so-determined. Note that
it is not generally the case that the probability of a conjunction is determined by the
probabilities of its conjuncts.
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the posterior credence in those underminers are not plausibly among the di-
rect e↵ects of experience, and hence Je↵rey Conditionalization together with
my proposal does not satisfy the second interpretation of Weisberg’s criterion:
some indirect e↵ects of experience are determined independently of Condi-
tionalization. But as I’ve argued, this is not a radical departure from Je↵rey
conditionalization without my proposal, which also fails to satisfy that crite-
rion.
That does not mean that my proposal is without cost. Any complete
theory of perceptual learning that employs Je↵rey conditionalization to de-
termine new beliefs from old beliefs and a weighted partition will require a
second rule for determining partitions from experience (possibly together with
old beliefs). The explanatory work to be done by the complete theory of per-
ceptual learning will be divided between these two rules, and the more of this
work that Je↵rey conditionalization can do the better supported it will be.
We’re left, then, with Weisberg’s first objection: that my proposal
involves a loss of explanatory power. In this he is completely correct. It
is unwelcome news that the Bayesian is unable to model the introduction
of a negative correlation between an exogenously revised proposition and its
underminers. He’s also correct that the input partitions will need to be more
complicated than those in my examples from §2.4, and so the auxiliary theory
bridging the gap between experience and input partition will be more complex
than the Bayesian might have initially supposed.
These are real objections to my proposal, and the best that can be
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done in response is to mitigate their badness. Two considerations to that
e↵ect. First, though the input partitions required by my proposal will involve
a significant number of originating propositions, that number is dwarfed by
the number of propositions that are not involved in it. Though the formal
model will be unable to explain the introduced negative correlation between
perceptually justified beliefs and their potential underminers, it will be able
to explain how those changes ought to a↵ect the agent’s credences in all other
propositions and hence to determine a posterior credence function. Even in its
reduced state the explanatory power of the Bayesian formalism is quite robust.
Second, as I argue below, Bayesians are already committed to a limitation upon
starting credence functions that’s closely analogous to this limitation upon
input partitions, and it’s unclear why the one constraint should be considered
more problematic that the other. Hence it’s unclear why Weisberg’s objection
to my proposal doesn’t generalize into a broader indictment of Bayesianism.
As noted, Probabilism ensures that certain evidential relations will be
encoded in any permissible credence function. For example, it ensures that
any evidence that makes it rationally permissible to set P
new
(A) to .7 also
makes it rationally permissible to set P
new
(¬A) to .3, and prohibits setting
P
new
(¬A&B) any higher than that. But not all intuitively mandatory eviden-
tial relations — those to which all rational agents are obliged to conform — are
encoded by Probabilism, and hence many probabilistically coherent credence
functions are intuitively impermissible. Famously, Probabilism fails to ensure
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words, if we wish to ensure that conditionalization determines a rationally
permissible credence function from an update on E the we must constrain our
prior credence functions in ways that go well beyond Probabilism.
In many cases this phenomenon appears innocuous, as when an agent
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The narrow point is that if the Bayesian is to regard inductive inference
as more epistemically respectable than counter-induction or non-induction,
they’ll need to go beyond mere Probabilism and impose further constraints
18See Goodman [1946] and [1983, p. 72-83].
19For Classical Bayesianism at least – the possible non-commutativity of Je↵rey Bayesian-
ism makes that case less straightforward. See Domotor [1980].
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upon starting credence functions. The broader point is this: for any E and
H such that E 2 H and H 2 E, ensuring that E supports H more than
some competing hypothesis depends crucially on the choice of starting cre-
dence function. We have lots of intuitions about evidential relations that go
beyond deductive entailment (e.g. the intuition that induction is preferable to
counter-induction), and in order to require of agents that they satisfy those in-
tuitions we have to constrain their starting credence functions. The Bayesian
formalism (= Probabilism + Conditionalization) does not impose those re-
strictions, and hence additional constraints on starting credence functions are
needed in order to ensure that their prior credence functions are rationally
permissible, which are themselves required in order for Conditionalization to
determine a rationally permissible posterior credence function given some per-
missible exogenous revision.
For the Bayesian, there are obvious parallels between what’s required
by Goodman’s New Riddle and what I’m proposing in response to Weisberg’s
puzzle: just as the former requires a constraint upon rationally permissible
starting credence functions, the latter requires a constraint upon exogenous
revisions. Ideally, both of those constraints would be imposed by the formal-
ism itself, but in both cases that’s proven not to be the case. If we assume
that Weisberg is objecting to proposals like mine, rather than to Bayesianism
in general, then the problem can’t simply be with the existence of intuitively
compelling constraints upon the formalism for which we have no widely ac-
cepted formal theory; we have no such theory for distinguishing ‘projectable’
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predicates like green from ‘unprojectable’ ones like grue, either. Presumably,
then, the objection must be either (i) that such constraints are more objection-
able at the exogenous revision side of the model than at the starting credence
function side, or (ii) to some other feature of undermining defeat that distin-
guishes it from broader inductive practice, and in virtue of which my proposal
is the more problematic. (i) seems arbitrary, and (ii) is not forthcoming. Seen
in this light it’s unclear how my proposal presents any special problem for
the Bayesian that isn’t closely analogous to a problem that they already have,
and hence it’s unclear how Weisberg is objecting to my proposal in particular
rather than to Bayesianism in general.
There’s one last objection that I’d like to consider. Weisberg [2015, 129]
considers a response a bit like mine, which he characterizes as the claim that
Je↵rey Conditionalization doesn’t ‘apply’ in cases of perpetual undermining.20
The thought here seems to be rooted in the late career Richard Je↵rey’s some-
what unorthodox views about the motivations for Conditionalization. One
prominent view among Bayesians is that agents ought to conditionalize be-
cause failure to do so leads to the sort of pragmatic defeat illustrated by the
Lewis/ Teller dynamic Dutch book argument. (Teller [1973]) Je↵rey thinks
that such considerations are beside the point,21 and conditionalization is mo-
20See Wagner [2013] for a defense of this view.
21Interestingly, Je↵rey [2004] motivates Total Probability with a Dutch Book argument
(§1.4) and then goes on to motivate Je↵rey conditionalization by appeal to Total Probability
(§3.2). Hence there’s a sense in which he does rely on considerations of pragmatic defeat
to motivate conditionalization, but only because those pragmatic considerations motivate
Probabilism.
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tivated — when it is motivated — by considerations of coherence alone. The
Total Probability theorem follows from the probability axioms plus the defini-















When the transition from an agent’s old credences to her new ones is










). Hence in such cases, by simple















The upshot is that concerns of synchronic coherence alone require that
we (Je↵rey) conditionalize upon our new evidence any time Rigidity holds.
On this way of seeing things, Rigidity is a precondition that must be satisfied
in order for Je↵rey Conditionalization to be applicable at all, rather than a
feature of every case of perceptual learning that must be accommodated by
all Bayesians (see footnote 7). That just leaves us with the following question:
when is this precondition satisfied? Not always, says Je↵rey. And therein lies
a possible answer to the puzzle: perhaps cases involving undermining defeaters
are cases in which Rigidity does not hold, and hence they are cases in which
Je↵rey conditionalization is unmotivated and inappropriate.
To this Weisberg very reasonably objects that perceptual justification
is nearly always vulnerable to undermining defeat, and hence if Je↵rey condi-
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tionalization is inapplicable in cases involving the possibility of underminers,
then it’s inapplicable in nearly every case of perceptual learning.
Weisberg is no doubt correct about the near ubiquity of potential under-
miners for perceptual experience, and so if conditionalization is to be rejected
in all such cases, then rational agents won’t be doing much conditionalizing.
But while this might be a serious problem for some other proposals, it’s no ob-
jection to mine (to be clear: Weisberg never says that it is). On my proposal,
Conditionalization applies in every case of perceptual learning. Underminable
perceptual learning requires changes to conditional probabilities, changes that
cannot be achieved endogenously through a rigid updating rule like Condi-
tionalization. I’ve proposed that any time the probability of some proposition
conditional on an originating proposition needs to change, that this change oc-
cur exogenously rather than via Conditionalization. This is important because
exogenous credence revisions are not constrained by Rigidity22 and hence need
not preserve independence. But once all such changes are encoded into the
partition, the rigidity of Conditionalization is completely unproblematic. Jef-
frey conditionalization then ‘applies’ to the partitions that are determined by
these (non-Rigid) exogenous revisions, and in this regard it’s just like every
22It’s not that exogenous revisions are anti-rigid, in the sense that they provide counterex-
amples to Rigidity, i.e. cases involving updates on a partition {B
i











); that’s just confused. The inputs to an exogenous revision
include experiences, so they’re not just partitions, and hence the antecedent of the Rigidity
conditional is always false in cases of exogenous revision. For that reason it’s more precise
to say that exogenous revisions are rigid, but only trivially so. The essential point is simply
that this ‘trivial rigidity’ does not preserve independence: there is no analogue of the RIP
principle for exogenous credence revisions.
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other version of Bayesianism.23,24
2.6 Conclusion
The introduction of a negative correlation is an essential aspect of ac-
quiring new information that is itself vulnerable to undermining defeat. Weis-
berg’s puzzle is important because it illustrates that Bayesians can’t model
this e↵ect in any straightforward way. Weisberg himself concludes that this is
a reason to reject subjective Bayesianism. I have argued that this conclusion is
too strong – the lesson instead is that Bayesians should reduce their explana-
tory ambitions, moving problematic aspects of undermining defeat o↵-model.
This move is appealing for several reasons. First, restores the consistency of
the Bayesian formalism with our intuitions about undermining defeat. Sec-
ond, the Bayesian account of perceptual learning has always presupposed that
some credences will be revised exogenously, revisions that to not proceed via
conditionalization, and so my proposal represents only an incremental increase
to an already existing aspect of the Bayesian theory rather than a new, dra-
matic departure. Third, while Conditionalization is rigid, Bayesian perceptual
23Thanks to an anonymous referee for call to my attention this aspect of my proposal.
24It’s not that exogenous revisions are anti-rigid, in the sense that they provide counterex-
amples to Rigidity, i.e. cases involving updates on a partition {B
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include experiences, so they’re not just partitions, and hence the antecedent of the Rigidity
conditional is always false in cases of exogenous revision. For that reason it’s more precise
to say that exogenous revisions are rigid, but only trivially so. The essential point is simply
that this ‘trivial rigidity’ does not preserve independence: there is no analogue of the RIP
principle for exogenous credence revisions.
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learning is not: since both Classical and Je↵rey Bayesians are committed to
exogenous revisions that change the ratio of the probability of conjunctions to
the probability of their conjuncts, it’s inevitable that conditional probabilities
themselves will change exogenously. So again, what I’m proposing isn’t a great
departure from the pre-Weisberg status quo. Fourth, my proposal doesn’t in-
volve commitment to any cases in which conditionalization doesn’t ‘apply’.
Fifth, and finally, there’s a long tradition of Bayesians imposing extra-formal
constraints upon their theory in order to deal with counter-intuitive conse-
quences of the minimal Probabilism + Conditionalization account, as they do
in response to Goodman’s New Riddle.
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Chapter 3
Holistic Conditionalization and Underminable
Perceptual Learning
3.1 Introductory Matters
3.1.1 The Incompleteness of Bayesianism
What do we expect from a theory of perceptual learning? Here’s
a plausible thought: a complete theory of the epistemology of perceptual
learning would specify how having some particular experience a↵ects the be-







(·) is the agent’s prior credence function, E
is the experience, and P
new
(·) is the posterior credence function that an agent
with P
old
(·) ought to adopt upon having experience E. Bayesian Conditional-
ization (specifically: Je↵rey Conditionalization), on the other hand, specifies
how a change in a handful of attitudes ought to a↵ect an agent’s other atti-
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>} are very di↵erent sorts of things — so Bayesian Conditionalization
is not a complete theory of the epistemology of perceptual learning.
In what sense, then, is Bayesianism a theory of perceptual learning?
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The idea seems to be that the initial or immediate e↵ect of experience E is to
spark revisions to a small number of credences, and that these revision lead to
other revisions that are mediated by a quasi-inferential process. In Bayesian





which in turn combines with the agent’s prior credence function to produce
the agent’s posterior credence function.1 Bayesianism is then a theory of the





>} — as input and via Conditionalization it produces a
posterior credence function P
new
(·) as output.
In what follows it will be important to clearly distinguish the cre-
dence revisions that proceed via Conditionalization from those that provide
the weighted partition to be conditionalized upon, so for convenience I’ll in-
troduce some terminology. The e↵ects of experience that are not modeled or
regulated by Conditionalization I’ll call exogenous revisions (as in exogenous to
the model), and the revisions that are modeled and so proceed by Condition-
alization I’ll call endogenous revisions.2 Hence the general Bayesian picture of
perceptual learning is a two-stage process that involves both types of revision:
1I don’t mean to commit myself to any particular account of which propositions are
immediately a↵ected by experience; for our purposes they are characterized simply as those
propositions whose revision does not proceed via Conditionalization. This become important
below, when I argue that the partitions that Bayesians should conditionalize upon are quite
complex.

















We are now in a position to say more carefully the sense in which
Bayesianism is an incomplete theory of perceptual learning. Whether the pos-
terior credence function adopted is rationally appropriate for an agent with
prior credence function P
old
(·) who has experience E, i.e. whether the posterior
credence function adopted is equal to P
new
(·), will depend not only upon the





>} was the appropriate response to E. Bayesianism doesn’t regu-
late those revisions, so Bayesianism doesn’t determine whether the posterior




Familiar objections to Bayesianism pick up on putative problems in-
side the model, problems that arise either from the demand for probabilisti-
cally coherent credences (e.g. the problem of logical omniscience) or from the
demand that all modeled credence revisions proceed via Conditionalization
(e.g. the problem of old evidence, the problem of invincible certainty). Im-
portantly, these objections arise from Bayesian constraints upon rational sets
of attitudes towards propositions. One more recent line of criticism contends
that the model imposes undesirable limitations upon the o↵-model or exoge-
nous credence revisions that result directly from experience. In particular, the
Bayesian formalism seems to combine awkwardly with the putatively holistic
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nature of perceptual confirmation.
3.1.2 Confirmation Holism
I understand Holism about perceptual confirmation as the thesis that
the appropriate immediate response to experience is determined not simply
by the experience, but by also in part by the agent’s background beliefs. In
other words, it’s possible that a pair of exogenous revisions to be such that
(P
old




>}) and (P 0
old




>}), (where i 6=
j). In this paper I’m not so concerned with whether confirmation holism is
true, though for the record I think that it is. My focus is instead upon the
consistency of Bayesianism and holism about perceptual confirmation.
Bayesians are committed to holism when it comes to the endogenous
credence revisions that proceed via Conditionalization. (Strict) Bayesian Con-
ditionalization requires that when I obtain some propositional evidence A I
must reset my credence in any other proposition B to: P
old
(B | A). These
conditional probabilities are standardly3 defined in terms of what the agent
believes about the correlation between the relevant propositions at the mo-
ment when she obtains propositional evidence A: if she believes that A and B
are positively correlated then she’ll think that P
old
(B | A) > P
old
(B), and so
when she increases her credence in A and conditionalizes she’ll end up increas-
ing her credence in B. Because Bayesians generally think that the evidential
significance of propositional evidence A is partially determined by background
3But not universally: see Hájek [2003] and Popper [1959].
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Hence Bayesians are committed to holism about propositional evidence just as
our Confirmation Holists are committed to holism about perceptual evidence.
The Bayesian formalism entails very few constraints upon the exoge-
nous e↵ects of experience and hence Bayesians are mostly free to accept or
reject holism about perceptual confirmation. One partial exception comes in
the form of Classical Bayesians who accept Strict Conditionalization. Strict
Conditionalization takes as evidence only propositional certainties, so holistic
considerations can’t determine the degree of confirmation that my evidence
propositions receive exogenously: if I’m going to strictly conditionalize upon
A, then A must be maximally confirmed.4 Nonetheless it’s possible that holis-
tic considerations will help to determine whether my experience confirms A or
some other proposition.
Je↵rey Bayesians5 relax the strictness of Strict Conditionalization, al-
lowing updates on propositions with credences less than 1 through Je↵rey
4Formally: for any P
old
(·) and P 0(·), P
A
(A) = P 0
A
(A) = 1.
5For our purposes a ‘Je↵rey Bayesian’ is any Bayesian who accepts Richard Je↵rey’s
generalization of Classical Conditionalization, and hence they need not be committed to














Later it will be important to be very clear about how Je↵rey Conditionalization
works, but I’ll put that o↵ until it becomes necessary.
Je↵rey Bayesians can accept holistic e↵ects to their exogenous revisions
in response to experience, and given the broader Bayesian sympathy for con-
firmation holism it would be somewhat perverse for them to reject it. One
holistic e↵ect will be of particular importance in this paper: the vulnerability
of perceptual justification to undermining defeat. When I have a visual expe-
rience as of the redness of the hat and become justified in believing the hat is
red, that justification is undermined when I learn that I’ve been hallucinating
all day: it’s not that I have some reason to believe that the hat is not red —
I haven’t obtained an opposing defeater — it’s that I’ve obtained some reason
to doubt that my perceptual experience rationally supports my belief.7
3.1.3
3.1.3 Weisberg’s puzzle
Jonathan Weisberg argues that Je↵rey Conditionalization is inconsis-
tent with common intuitions about a specific type of holistic e↵ect: undermin-








7For more on undermining defeat and its relation to opposing defeat see [Pollock and
Cruz, 1999, 196-7].
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just a↵ect my beliefs about the color of the hat or about my own experiences,
it also a↵ects what constitutes a defeater for those beliefs. Before I have my
experience as of the hat I would regard I’m hallucinating as evidentially inde-
pendent of the hat is red — neither confirming nor disconfirming it — an inde-
pendence that is expressed formally as P
old
(red | hallucinating) = P
old
(red).
After my experience as of the hat’s redness I become much more confident that
the hat is in fact red, an increase that’s based in my experience, but at this
point I no longer think that those propositions are independent. After all, my
high confidence is based on the experience, and learning that I was hallucinat-
ing is a good reason to doubt that my experience is an appropriate basis for
my belief. Hence I now believe that P
new
(red | hallucinating) < P
new
(red).
But that change in my conditional probabilities is impossible, Weisberg ar-
gues, because Je↵rey Conditionalization is ‘rigid’ with respect to the elements
of the update partition8












8Proof: Let e1 be one the ei 2 {ei}. The ei are pairwise inconsistent, so for any ej 2 {ei}
such that e
j
6= e1, Pold(A&e1 | ej) = 0, meaning that, trivially, Pold(A&e1 | ej) ·Pnew(ej) =







(A&e1 | ei) · Pnew(ei), but we’ve
just seen that when a partition element other than e1 is taken as the value of ei, the value
of the resulting summand is 0. It follows that P
new
(A&e1) = Pold(A&e1 | e1) · Pnew(e1).




(A&e1 | e1), and the right side
of the equation simplifies to P
old





(A | e1). Hence for any partition element e1 and





(A | e1) = Pnew(A | e1), i.e. Je↵rey Conditionalization is rigid with respect to the
elements of update partition.
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Rigidity says that updating on a partition with element e
i
can’t change
my credence in any other proposition conditional on e
i
. That’s problematic
because rigidity is independence preserving (RIP):9
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Hence if the hat is red and I’m hallucinating are evidentially indepen-
dent, and then I conditionalize on a partition including the hat is red as an
element, then those propositions must remain independent. That’s inconsis-
tent with the compelling story that I just told about the functioning of under-
mining defeaters, and so Weisberg concludes that Bayesian Conditionalization
should be rejected.
3.1.4 Gallow’s Two Claims
Elsewhere I’ve argued that Je↵rey Conditionalization is consistent with
perceptual learning that’s vulnerable to undermining defeat, an argument that
I summarize in section 3.2 below. An alternative approach has been advocated
by Dmitri Gallow, who holds that Weisberg’s puzzle provides grounds for
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so independence is preserved.
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rejecting Je↵rey Conditionalization in favor of an alternative update rule that
he calls ‘Holistic Conditionalization’:
[Weisberg’s puzzle shows that] neither Conditionalization nor Jef-
frey Conditionalization. . . is capable of accommodating the confir-
mation holist’s claim that beliefs acquired directly from experience
can su↵er undermining defeat. I will diagnose this failure as stem-
ming from the fact that neither of these rules give any advice about
how to rationally respond to experiences in which our evidence is
theory-dependent, and I will propose a novel updating procedure
which does tell us how to respond to these experiences. [Gallow,
2014, 1-2]
My purpose in this essay is to defend the superiority of my solution to
Wiesberg’s puzzle against Gallow’s, a purpose that I pursue by refuting the
two claims that Gallow makes in the above passage: that Je↵rey Condition-
alization cannot accommodate perceptual confirmation that’s vulnerable to
undermining defeat, and that the alternative ‘Holistic Conditionalization’ and
‘Holistic Conditionalization*’ rules that he proposes are superior to Je↵rey
Conditionalization.
3.2 Je↵rey Conditionalization and Undermining Defeat
In this section I argue contra Gallow that Je↵ery Conditionalization
is consistent with perceptual learning that is vulnerable to undermining de-
feat. It’s not that Je↵rey Conditionalization isn’t rigid, or that rigidity doesn’t
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preserve independence; it is, and it does. But the independence that Rigidity
preserves is between each element of the partition and every other proposition;
no other independence relations are preserved by rigidity.10 As a result, the
construction of a rigidity puzzle requires careful attention to the which propo-
sitions are selected as the elements of the input partition: if the independence
of the hat is red and I’m hallucinating is to be preserved (as the puzzle re-
quires), then one of those propositions must be an element of the partition.
But the Bayesian formalism is consistent with a wide range of input partitions,
and as a result the input partitions required by Weisberg’s puzzle are optional
for the Je↵rey Conditionalizer.
So how are the elements of the input partition selected? One appealing
thought is that the elements of the partition are the propositions directly or
immediately a↵ected by the experience. For example, a hat-like experience
might immediately a↵ect the hat is red and the hat is dirty and no other
propositions, in which case the input partition would consist of those two
propositions as elements. Clearly the propositions directly a↵ected by experi-
ence should be among those exogenously revised, and hence they must appear
in the input partition, in some sense of ‘appear in’. But there is good reason
to doubt that they must always appear as the elements of that partition, a
reason that has nothing to do with undermining or with Weisberg’s puzzle.
10Too strong: any propositions with a credence of 1 credence 1 (i) is independent of ev-
ery other proposition, and (ii) cannot have its credence revised downward, and and hence
by (i) will always be independent of every other proposition. Trivially, then, the indepen-
dence of every credence 1 proposition with every other proposition is preserved across every
Conditionalization.
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The problem is that the elements of a partition must be pairwise inconsistent
and exhaustive of the probability space, and this pair is likely to be neither.11
Je↵rey Conditionalization takes only partitions as arguments, and hence this
would be a case in which the agent is unable to update.
Richard Je↵rey was familiar with this potential problem. In response
he proposed that, in many cases at least, input partitions must be more com-
plicated than a mere set of immediately a↵ected propositions. His suggestion
is that the partitions contain a set of conjunctions, each conjunct of which
is either one of our directly a↵ected propositions or its negation, with every
directly a↵ected proposition or its negation appearing exactly once in each
conjunction. Hence upon having an experience as of the dirty red hat, instead
of taking red and dirty as the elements of my partition (which typically won’t
actually result in a partition) I should conditionalize upon a partition with
elements red & dirty, red & ¬dirty,¬red & dirty, and ¬red & ¬dirty.
Je↵rey’s proposal allows the propositions immediately a↵ected by expe-
rience to be included in the input partition without including them as elements
of that partition. This in turn allows their posterior credences to be deter-
mined exogenously, while at the same time enabling conditionalization upon
11Why just ‘likely’ to be neither? What’s important is that the elements of the partition be
exclusive and exhaustive relative to the probability space of the relevant agent, not exclusive
and exhaustive of every possible probability space. To illustrate with an example, the hat
is red and the hat is blue are logically consistent, but relative to the probability space of
an agent with normal beliefs about color-exclusion they will be exclusive. Similarly, those
propositions will not in every case be exhaustive, but they will exhaust the probability space
of an agent who is certain that the hat is either red or blue.
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an element composed of propositions that do not straightforwardly form a
partition.
Je↵rey’s proposal also suggests a solution to Weisberg’s puzzle. Rigid-
ity prevents the introduction of a negative correlation between the elements of
a partition and any proposition that isn’t an element of the partition. Taking
the elements of our partitions to be conjunctions doesn’t change that: Condi-
tionalization still cannot introduce a correlation between one of our elements
— one of the conjunctions — and some other proposition. What it can do,
however, is to introduce a correlation between the conjuncts of one of those
conjunctive elements.







so the posterior weights of conjunctions A&B and A&¬B together determine
the posterior weight of A and (trivially) the posterior weight of A&B. By
the definition of conditional probability, P
new





and hence the weights of the conjunctions determine the value of P
new
(A | B).
A and B are independent i↵ P
new
(A | B) = P
new
(A), and hence their inde-
pendence (or lack thereof) is completely determined by the posterior weights
of the conjunctive elements of the partition, weights that are themselves as-
signed exogenously. The upshot is that it’s possible to introduce the desired
correlation between A and B by exogenously re-weighting the elements of the
partition.
To illustrate how this might actually work as a response to Weisberg’s
puzzle, suppose that I start out thinking that the hat is red and I’m halluci-
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nating are independent: P
old
(red | hallucinating) = P
old
(red) = 1/2. Then I











< red & hallucinating, 1/10 >
< red & ¬hallucinating, 7/10 >
< ¬red & hallucinating, 1/10 >
< ¬red & ¬hallucinating, 1/10 >
My posterior credence function P
new
(·) will now be such that:
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new























In other words, the hat is red and I’m hallucinating started out independent
and ended up negatively correlated: were I subsequently to become certain
that I was hallucinating when I had my experience as of the redness of the hat
I would reduce my credence in the hat is red back to 1/2.
Recall that the putatively problematic cases of perceptual learning vul-
nerable to undermining defeat are ones in which the rational response to ex-
perience E is (i) to increase my confidence in some proposition e and (ii) to
introduce a negative correlation between e and some undermining defeater u.
The rigidity of Je↵rey Conditionalization means that if e is an element of the
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input partition then (ii) is impossible, but it should now be clear that con-
ditionalizing on a partition with elements e&u, e&¬u,¬e&u, and ¬e&¬u is
capable of achieving both (i) and (ii).
Doesn’t the rigidity of Conditionalization prevent this sort of move?
No. Above I distinguished two types of credence revisions: the endogenous
revisions that proceed via Je↵rey Conditionalization and hence are regulated
by it, and the exogenous revisions that determine the propositional evidence
to be conditionalized upon (i.e. the input partition). Since only the endoge-
nous revisions proceed via Conditionalization, only endogenous revisions are
constrained by the rigidity of that rule. The elements of input partitions and
the weights of those elements are the result of exogenous revisions, and so are
not constrained by the rigidity of Conditionalization.
Though this approach is formally adequate, is not without cost. Con-
junctive elements are not the ‘direct’ or ‘immediate’ e↵ects of experience in
any intuitive sense, and hence my response to Weisberg’s puzzle requires that
we reject the picture of Bayesianism as a theory of all of the indirect epistemic
e↵ects of experience; far more will have to be left out. In particular, much
of what’s interesting about undermining defeat will be moved outside of the
model (i.e. much of it will be unregulated by Conditionalization) and hence
will be left unexplained.12
I motivate this move in other work. [Manuscript] My purpose in this
12For an objection to this sort of move see Christensen [1992].
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essay is to argue that Je↵rey Conditionalization is a superior updating rule
to Holistic Conditionalization and to Holistic Conditionalization*, and as it
turns out the independent motivations for Je↵rey Conditionalization aren’t
terribly important to that task. My purpose in the present section has been to
rebut Gallow’s claim that Je↵rey Conditionalization is not ‘capable of accom-
modating the confirmation holist’s claim that beliefs acquired directly from
experience can su↵er undermining defeat.’ [Gallow, 2014, 1-2]. It should now
be obvious that this claim is false: Je↵rey Conditionalization is perfectly con-
sistent with perceptual learning that’s vulnerable to undermining defeat, on
the condition that both the propositions ‘acquired directly from experience’
and their potential underminers are taken as conjuncts of the conjunctive el-
ements of the input partition.
3.3 Holistic Conditionalization
In the previous section I argued that Je↵rey Conditionalization is per-
fectly consistent with the phenomenon of undermining defeat, and hence Gal-
low’s first claim is false. Nonetheless his proposed solution to Weisberg’s puzzle
— the rejection of Je↵rey Conditionalization in favor of Holistic Condition-
alization — might be preferable for other reasons. In this section I describe
Gallow’s first alternative proposal with particular attention to how it relates to
Je↵rey Conditionalization, before moving on in the next section to arguments
for the superiority of the latter over the former.
I’ve described confirmation holism as the very general thesis that the
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evidential significance of experience is partially determined by the agent’s back-
ground beliefs: that experience E might produce one weighted partition for an
agent with P
old
(·) and another for an agent with P 0
old
(·). This very general
thesis can be made more precise in a number of ways. According to one very
strong version of holism there’s simply nothing more to be said about how
P
old
(·) contributes to the determination of the partition: the contribution is
made by the agent’s doxastic state taken as a whole, rather than individual
contributions made by attitudes toward individual propositions. But there’s
reason to believe that more can be said. Consider again the case of E, my vi-
sual experience as of the red hat. It’s plausible that my beliefs about current
lighting conditions and about the reliability of my own perceptual faculties
play a role in determining the epistemic significance of E. It’s far less plausible
that my beliefs about the atomic number of copper or about the capital of
Peru have any such role to play.
For the näıve Je↵rey Conditionalizer — one who thinks that the input
partition is the set of propositions directly a↵ected by the experienc — it
doesn’t matter what aspects of P
old
(·) combine with E to determine the input
partition, whether it’s the function taken as a whole, or just some subset
of the credences determined by it. Once the input partition is determined
exogenously the holistic e↵ects of those prior credences can be ignored, as
Conditionalization will determine the posterior credence function solely from
the prior credence function and the input partition.
The Holistic Conditionalizer sees this as problematic. On their view,
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the evidential significance of experience depends upon the agent’s background
theories about what the world is like — e.g. I’m the victim of a Cartesian
demon, or My perceptual faculties are functioning normally — and this depen-
dence is essential to responding to Weisberg’s puzzle. Background theories are
propositions, and so they are assigned credences by my prior credence function
P
old
(·). Thus confirmation holism is true — Emight produce one weighted par-
tition for an agent with P
old





(·) and P 0
old
(·) might assign di↵erent credences to the relevant background
theories on which the epistemic significance of E depends.
According to the Holistic Conditionalizer, the problem with Je↵rey
Conditionalization is that it’s sensitive only to the fact that E produced the
propositional evidence that it did, and it’s not at all sensitive to the reason
why E produced the evidence that it did. Since those dependence facts aren’t
reflected in the agent’s prior credence function (how could they – they’re not
facts yet!), and since those dependence facts aren’t represented in the updating
procedure of the näıve Je↵rey Conditionalizer,13 those dependence facts won’t
be reflected in the posterior credence function either. Finally, since reference
to those facts is essential to any solution to Weisberg’s puzzle (see section
3.3.1), the näıve Je↵rey Conditionalizer will be unable to solve the puzzle.
The general idea is simple: the propositional evidence generated by
experience depends upon the agent’s attitudes towards their background theo-
13Remember: the näıve Je↵rey Conditionalizer is näıve because they exclude those de-
pendence relations from their input partitions.
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ries, and since agents are not always certain which background theory is true,
they are not always in a position to determine whether some proposition is
evidence. What they are in a position to do, however, is to determine whether
some proposition would be evidence, given the truth of a particular background
theory.
For example, suppose that I’m not sure whether I’m the victim of a
Cartesian demon or a Cartesian angel, but I’m sure that it’s one or the other
(and not both). If it’s the demon then I can be sure that my experiences are
all misleading ; call this background theory t
M
. But if I’m the beneficiary of a
Cartesian angel then could be sure that my experiences are perfectly veridical ;
call that background theory t
V
. If my experiences are all misleading then my
experience as of the red hat produces propositional evidence the hat is not red,
and if my experience is perfectly veridical then my evidence is the hat is red.
Because I’m not sure which theory is correct, I’m not sure what my
propositional evidence would be once I’ve had experience E, so I’m not sure
how to update my credences in light of my experience. But since I’m sure
that, if t
V
is true,14 then my evidence is the hat is red, I can calculate what
my posterior credences would be if I had been sure that t
V
were true. In that
case I would be sure that t
V
is true (trivially) and I would have received the
hat is red as my propositional evidence (becoming certain of it as well), and
so I would be sure of their conjunction. I know what to do when I become
14That’s a little misleading: it’s not the truth of t
V





certain of some proposition: I conditionalize. Hence even though I don’t know
which of my background theories is true, I know that if I had been certain of
t
V







& the hat is red)
For analogous reasons I’m in a position to calculate that, if I had been sure
that t
M







& the hat is not red)
Gallow proposes two very similar updating rules for translating this
information into posterior credence functions. Both rules involve calculating
P
new











di↵erence being the way that the summands are weighted. With the stipulating
that the t
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).16 In other words,







(t1&e1 | ti&ei) · Pold(ti).
One of the t
i
will be t1 itself, and so one of the summands must be Pold(t1&e1 | t1&e1) ·
P
old
(t1) = Pold(t1). The other summands are calculated using the other ti, but those
values will all be 0: since the background theories form a partition they must be pairwise
inconsistent, so for every t
i
6= t1, Pold(t1&e1 | ti 6=1&ei 6=1) ·Pold(ti 6=1) = 0. The result is that
P
new
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according to Holistic Conditionalization, episodes of learning from experience
can’t a↵ect credences in the agent’s background theories. That’s problematic
in certain cases (see below), and so Gallow o↵ers a generalization of Holis-
tic Conditionalization on which revisions to the probabilities of background
theories are accommodated. Where  
i
is a quantity that re-weights each
background theory t
i





















3.3.1 Holistic Conditionalization and Weisberg’s Puzzle
Before moving on let’s look carefully at how Holistic Conditionalization
(and by extension Holistic Conditionalization*) solves Weisberg’s puzzle. Re-
call that the puzzle arises because experience has at least two distinct epistemic
e↵ects: it provides propositional evidence, and it introduces negative correla-
tions between that propositional evidence and its potential undermining de-
featers. The putative problem for Je↵rey Conditionalization is that although
there is no barrier to incorporating newly acquired propositional evidence into
the posterior credence function, the rigidity of that rule appears to make it im-
possible to introduce the necessary correlations between propositional evidence
and its undermining defeaters. I have proposed that Je↵rey Conditionalizers
respond to Weisberg’s puzzle by conditionalizing upon conjunctions of the
newly acquired propositional evidence and its potential undermining defeater.
This solves the puzzle by introducing the needed correlation at the point at
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which the input partition is selected — the exogenous revision stage — which
obviates the need to introduce that correlation via Conditionalization (which
is impossible).
Holistic Conditionalization avoids the problem in essentially the same
way. Any propositions that need to become correlated with the evidence
propositions, including any potential undermining defeaters, are taken to be
the background theories: the t
i
.17 After holistically conditionalizing, each
e
i
becomes certain, conditional upon t
i




















will be positively correlated. The existence of this
















are independent of one another. Because a positive correla-









. That means that any subsequent increase in my confi-
dence in ¬t
i
will result in a decrease in my confidence in e
i
. In other words,
¬t
i
is now a defeater for e
i
.20
17In some cases the relevant background theories will fail to form a partition and so
partitions will need to be constructed out of conjunctions of background theories. In such
cases the theory/ evidence conjunctions input to Holistic Conditionalization will be of the
form t1&...&tN&e. This procedure will mirror the one that I described in section 3.2, with
like e↵ect. See [Gallow, 2014, 11, fn. 13].



































20That’s a bit too strong. It’s possible that I’ll decrease my confidence in t
i
because I’ve








) = 1. In that
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I’ll illustrate how this works with an example. Recall the case above
in which my background theories are my experiences are perfectly veridical
(= t
V
) and my experiences are perfectly misleading (= t
M
). Upon having an
experience as of a red hat, the truth of t
V
would produce propositional evidence
the hat is red, but the truth of t
M
would produce propositional evidence the
hat is not red. Holistic Conditionalization suggests that my posterior credence
in the hat is red should be the sum of P
old





(¬red & misleading) ·P
old
(misleading), and that there should now be
a perfect correlation between red and veridical, and also between ¬red and
misleading. Hence if I were to become more confident that my experiences are
misleading I’d thereby become more confident that the hat isn’t red, i.e. the
























Figure 3.1: Visual representation of how Holistic Conditionalization solves
Weisberg’s puzzle.
case my credence in e
i
won’t change. Any decreased credence in t
i
will be accompanied by
an increased credence in some other t
k
, and in order for that shift to result in a decreased
credence in e
i








This diagram represents a case in which I start out with credence func-
tion P
old




as equally probable, the hat is red and the hat
is not red are equally probable, and the background theories are independent of
the redness of the hat. After my experience as of the red hat I adopt credence
function P
new
(·), on which t
V
becomes perfectly correlated with the hat is red
and t
M
becomes perfectly correlated with the hat is not red, but my uncondi-




new⇤(·) is occasioned by my acquisition of an undercutting
defeater for the hat is red, which increases my confidence in t
M




Note that nothing about this story requires that my credence in the var-
ious background theories remain unchanged as a result of the learning episode.
The only di↵erence between Holistic Conditionalization and Holistic Condi-
tionalization* is that the latter allows such changes in credence in background
theory, and hence the response to Weisberg’s puzzle will be the same for each.
3.4 Holistic Conditionalization and Je↵rey Condition-
alization
Gallow claims that the lesson of Weisberg’s puzzle is that Je↵rey Con-
ditionalization is inconsistent with important aspects of undermining defeat,
and hence that Je↵rey Conditionalization should be rejected in favor of Holistic
Conditionalization. We’ve now seen that this is false: both Je↵rey Condition-
alization and Holistic Conditionalization o↵er technically adequate solutions
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to Weisberg’s puzzle, and hence the puzzle itself o↵ers no reason to prefer one
rule to the other. In this section I argue on independent grounds that Je↵rey
Conditionalization should be preferred.
Astute readers will have noticed that Je↵rey Conditionalization and
Holistic Conditionalization are very similar rules. I begin by clarifying the
relationship between the two, demonstrating that Holistic Conditionalization
is a special case of Je↵rey Conditionalization.
There are two conditions which must be met in order or an updating
rule to be a special case of some other updating rule. First, the domain of the
less general rule rule — the special case — must be a proper subset of of the
domain of the more general rule. In other words, any possible input to the
less general rule will also be a possible input to the more general rule. Second,
both rules must specify the same posterior credence function for every possible
input to the less general rule (which by our first condition is also a possible
input to the more general rule).
Strict Conditionalization is standardly considered to be a special case
of Je↵rey Conditionalization. As we saw in section 3.1.1, Je↵rey Conditional-








(·), i.e. the inputs to
that rule consist of a prior credence function together with a weighted partition
of the prior probability space. Strict Conditionalization is a procedure for up-
dating on a propositional certainty. It has the form (P
old
(·), < e, 1 >) 7! P
e
(·),
where e is the proposition and 1 represents the fact that credence in e has
been raised to the highest level, i.e. that e certain.
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In order to establish that Strict Conditionalization is a special case of
Je↵rey Conditionalization we begin by showing that < e, 1 > determines a




>}. Every probability space is parti-
tioned by {e,¬e}, and hence {< e, 1 >,< ¬e, 0 >} is a partition with elements
whose weights sum to 1. In other words, it’s a possible input to Je↵rey Con-
ditionalization. Je↵rey Conditionalizing upon that weighted partition means
setting P
new
(·) equal to (P
old
(· | e) · 1) + (P
old
(· | ¬e) · 0) = P
old
(· | e), which is
precisely what Strict Conditionalization recommends. Hence our two condi-
tions are met — the domain of Strict Conditionalization is a proper subset of
the domain of Je↵rey Conditionalization, and both rules recommend the same
posterior credence function for each element common to both domains — so
Strict Conditionalization is a special case of Je↵rey Conditionalization.
Gallow observes that Strict Conditionalization is also a special case of










(·): it defines a posterior credence function from a prior




pairs. If for some reason the
agent’s background theories do not holistically a↵ect the propositional evidence
received from experience, the t
i









(· | e). The result is the same
when a number of background theories determine exactly the same evidence
proposition, i.e. when each of the t
i
is conjoined with the exact same evidence
proposition e.
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A casual reader of Gallow’s paper could be forgiven for thinking that
Je↵rey Conditionalization too is a special case of Holistic Conditionalization,
but that’s false; actually the relationship is the other way around. Recall
that Holistic Conditionalization requires that the set of relevant background
theories {t
i





} also forms a partition.21 Holistic Conditional-




be equal to their prior credence in t
i
, thereby providing weight !
i
to each el-










}) input to Holistic








>}) input to Je↵rey Con-
ditionalization. Hence the domain of Holistic Conditionalization is a subset of
the domain of Je↵rey Conditionalization.
The point of this section is to demonstrate that Holistic Conditional-
ization is a special case of Je↵rey Conditionalization. I’ve now shown that
each possible input to Holistic Conditionalization is also a possible input to
Je↵rey Conditionalization. What’s left is to show that each rule produces an
identical output for every possible input to Holistic Conditionalization.
Recall that Holistic Conditionalization says that:
21Assuming that no theory generates propositional evidence that it regards as impossible.
Dropping this assumption is disastrous for Holistic Conditionalization: since the posterior

















) > 0 as well. Hence dropping our assumption would require that




















































This is precisely what Je↵rey Conditionalization would advise when




, which is the form
shared by all inputs common to both rules. Hence Holistic Conditionalization
is a special case of Je↵rey Conditionalization.22
3.4.1 Holistic Conditionalization is Rigid
In section 3.2 I argued that the rigidity of Je↵rey Conditionalization is
perfectly compatible with perceptual learning that is vulnerable to undermin-
ing defeat. To remove any lingering doubt on that point I’ll demonstrate that
Holistic Conditionalization, which is undoubtedly consistent with perceptual
learning that’s vulnerable to undermining defeat, is also rigid.





} and propositional evidence e
1
generated by E together with t
1
.





















































were arbitrarily selected it follows that for any possible back-
ground theory t
i
































































is at least possible),


































In other words, Holistic Conditionalization is rigid with respect to the elements
of its input partition,23 so there’s no inconsistency between rigid updating rules
and perceptual learning that’s vulnerable to undermining defeat.
3.4.2 Holistic Conditionalization and
Je↵rey Conditionalization, Again
I started out this paper noting that Je↵rey Conditionalization is not a
complete theory of perceptual learning. As I’ve described things, the agent’s
posterior credences are the product of two distinct credence revisions: an









>})), and an endogenous revision on
which that weighted partition together with the agent’s prior credence function









Since only the endogenous revision is governed by Je↵rey Conditionalization,
that rule is incomplete as a theory of perceptual learning.
It should now be clear that Holistic Conditionalization too is an incom-
plete theory of perceptual learning, one that requires both endogenous and
exogenous credence revisions while governing only the latter. Here things look
slightly di↵erent, with exogenous credence revisions mapping experiences to
23Here’s a second way to see the same point: the rigidity of Je↵rey conditionalization
ensures that probabilities conditional on elements of the input partition never change via
Conditionalization. We’ve now seen (section 3.4) that Holistic Conditionalization is a spe-
cial case of Je↵rey Conditionalization, meaning that any shared input generates the same
posterior credence function and hence the same posterior probabilities condition on elements
of the input partition. In other words, Je↵rey Conditionalization is rigid, so every special
case of that rule are rigid, so Holistic Conditionalization is rigid.
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weighted partitions, where each partition element is a conjunction of a back-











>})), and endogenous revisions that determine the posterior credence
function based on prior credences together with this partition.
Nonetheless, there is a case to be made that Holistic Conditionalization
is less incomplete than Je↵rey Conditionalization because it requires less work
to be done exogenously, and hence more of the agent’s response to experience is
governed by the rule. The inputs to the both rules contain three components:
(i) the prior credence function, (ii) the elements of the partition, and (iii) the
weights of those elements. For both rules, (i) is a pre-existing condition that
does not need to be explained by a theory of perceptual learning, and (ii) is de-
termined by the exogenous revision. But while Je↵rey Conditionalization also
requires (iii) to be determined in addition to (i) and (ii), updating via Holistic
Conditionalization does not. As we’ve seen, the elements of the Holistic Con-




, and the weight of
each of those elements is set equal to the prior credence in t
i
. In other words,
once (i) and (ii) are determined, (iii) is determined as well, and hence only (ii)
needs to be determined exogenously. In contrast, Je↵rey Conditionalization
determines the weights of the partition elements (i.e. the !
i
) separately from
the identity of those elements, and hence in order to updating using that rule
both (ii) and (iii) must be determined exogenously.
Unfortunately, although Holistic Conditionalization seems to have more
explanatory power than Je↵rey Conditionalization, some of those explanations
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are incorrect. Holistic Conditionalization implies that experience shouldn’t
change my credence in any of my background theories, but sometimes those
credences should change in light of my experiences. Suppose that I have an
experience as of a red hat. I’m sure that one of my two background the-
ories is correct: either the lighting is normal or the lighting is red. If the
lighting is normal then I receive as evidence the hat is red, and if the light
is red then I don’t receive any evidence at all;24 hence my input partition is
{< light normal,red hat >,< light red ,> >}. But since this experience is pre-
cisely what one would expect to have upon looking at a hat under a red light,
one e↵ect of my experience is that I ought to become more confident in that
background theory, which by Holistic Conditionalization is impossible.
The lesson is this: because Holistic Conditionalization determines the
weights of its partition elements in terms of the prior credence function, it
enjoys a potential explanatory advantage over Je↵rey Conditionalization, on
which those weights must be determined independently. But this advantage
comes at a cost in terms of accuracy, as some of those endogenously determined
weights are rationally inappropriate. Je↵rey Conditionalization places very
few constraints upon the weights of the partition elements, and hence it does
not face the same problem. Hence there’s strong reason to prefer Je↵rey
Conditionalization to Holistic Conditionalization.
24Below I consider a more realistic version of this case in which both theories also produce
it appears as though the hat is red as evidence.
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3.5 Holistic Conditionalization*
Holistic Conditionalization is unacceptable because it does not allow an
agent’s perceptual experience to a↵ect their credence in a relevant background
theory. One way to fix the problem is simply to incorporate a numerical





































. Hence if  
i
is any
value greater than 1 then the credence in t
i
increases, and if  
i
is less than 1
then the credence in t
i
decreases.
Gallow proposes an ingenious way to calculate the values of the  
i
from
the prior credence function that is broadly in line with Bayesian commitments
to theory confirmation. Recall that on Holistic Conditionalization*,  
i
is sim-









this way, both Strict and Je↵rey Conditionalization too have  -values equal
to their probability ratios. A probability ratio represents the degree of confir-
mation that a theory receives from its successful prediction of the evidence by
comparing the prior probability of the evidence conditional on the theory to
the prior unconditional probability of that evidence. This quantity can then
be multiplied by the prior probability of the theory to determine its posterior
probability. When the evidence is a propositional certainty (as required by











Informally, the function of the denominator is to establish a baseline probabil-
ity for the evidence against which to compare the probability of that evidence
conditional on the theory, as represented in the numerator. If the evidence
is made more probable by the theory, then  
t







, that means that t is confirmed by the evidence. And since we’ve
stipulated that the background theories form a partition, if one theory receives
a credence boost by having a  -value greater than 1, that boost must come
at the expense of some other theory with a  -value less than 1.
When the evidence is a weighted partition rather than a propositional
certainty (as permitted by Je↵rey Conditionalization), the probability ratio of




















Here each element of the evidence partition establishes its own base-
line against which the probability of that element conditional on the theory is
measured. As before, if a given partition element is more probable conditional
on t than conditional on > (i.e. than the unconditional probability of that
element) then the value of that fraction is greater than 1. The value of  
t
,
then, is the sum of those fractions weighted by the posterior credences of each
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will be greater than 1 (thus indi-
cating that t is confirmed by {e
j
}) i↵ a su cient number of partition elements
are made su ciently more probable relative to their individual baselines and
then weighted su ciently highly.
The  -values of Holistic Conditionalization* are determined by con-
siderations similar to those of Je↵rey Conditionalization: the relative success
with which the agent predicts the evidence. However, for Holistic Conditional-
ization* the formal implementation of that approach is complicated by the fact
that the background theories are allowed to disagree about what the evidence
is: it might be the case that if t is true then the evidence is e, but if t0 is true
then the evidence is e0. This is important in the present context because the
prior probability of the evidence is the baseline against which each theory’s
predictive success is measured, and hence without a shared body of evidence
there’s no shared unit of measurement.
This problem does not arise for Je↵rey Conditionalization, at least if we
assume that t and t0 do not appear in the input partition (either as elements
of that partition, or as conjuncts in those elements). In that case there’s no
disagreement about the nature of the evidence, no temptation to relativize
evidence propositions to background theories (“relative to t the evidence is
e, but relative to t0 the evidence is e0...”). Instead, ‘the evidence’ is just the
evidence: input partition {e}.
Although Holistic Conditionalization* allows for lots of disagreement
about whether or not some proposition is part of the evidence, there will also
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be lots of agreement. For example, suppose that my background theories are
the lighting is normal and the lighting is red and then I have an experience as
of a red hat. While my background theories might disagree about whether the
hat is red is part of my evidence, presumably they will agree that it appears
as if the hat is red is part of my evidence. Presumably it will also be the case
that one theory does a much better job at predicting this shared evidence than
the other: if the lighting is red, then any hat that I will see is going to appear
to be red, where as normal lighting is consistent with the appearance of a hat
of any color. Hence the shared evidence more strongly confirms the lighting
is red than the lighting is normal. Informally, then, the proposal is that we
calculate the  -value for each theory using only shared evidence and ignoring
disputed evidence.
Formally, we begin by establishing the shared baseline against which
the predictive success of our background theories can be measured. Let {e
j
}
be the set of propositions that are accepted as evidence by at least one theory,
and let {t
i
} be a set of background theories (as before the background theories




} there will be a non-empty subset of {t
i
}
consisting of theories that regard e
1
as evidence. Let ⌧
1
be the the set of
background theories that regard e
1












25 as a common baseline against which to measure the success of each t
i
in
25This is somewhat confusing: how can we define the probability of proposition e1 con-











. Finally, the  -value for each background theory t is determined by



























































I’ll illustrate how this works by working through the example above and
then describing the contribution of each part of the equation in determining
the relevant  -values. There are two relevant background theories — t
N
= the
lighting in normal and t
R





. I’ve adopted Gallow’s notation here, and apparently this is what he has in
mind.















)’? The point of the  -values is to calculate the
credence increase or decrease that theories receive its success in predicting each evidence
proposition e
j
when that theory regards e
j
as evidence, and for that predictive success to
be irrelevant when that theory does regard e
j
















































































































of 1/2. Upon having an experience as of a red hat, both theories agree that
e
Ar





the hat is red as evidence. For each evidence proposition e
i
there is a set ⌧
i
of











}. The credence in each of those sets is






































Before my experience as of a red hat, I think that it is fairly unlikely that
the hat is red, and also that its redness is independent of facts about the current

















However, I think it far more likely that it will appear as if the hat is red given














This allows us to calculate the remaining values required to determine
 
tR and  tN . Pold(eAr | ⌧Ar) is the credence of evidence eAr conditional on












tR ’s half of the probability space and 1/5 of ⌧tN ’s half, so Pold(eAr | ⌧Ar) = 3/10.
Since t
N















We’re now in a position to calculate  
tN and  tR . By definition:
27While the redness of the lighting would make just about everything look red, it would



































are the only two propositions regarded as evidence by either
theory, and since t
N












































































































are the only two propositions regarded as evidence by either















































































Now for an informal explanation of what’s going on with each part of
the equation. Background theories are required to form a partition, and hence
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any increase in credence for one theory must come at the cost of a decrease
in credence for some other theory. In particular, when a theory increases in
credence due to its successfully prediction of an evidence proposition, that
increase comes at the cost of a decrease in credence for other theories. The
overall e↵ect a theory’s predictive success upon the credence in that theory
(i.e. its  -value) is a function of the theory’s success in predicting each of
the evidence propositions, and hence the things to be explained are (i) how
a theory’s success in predicting each evidence proposition is to be measured,
and (ii) how these measures a theory’s success in predicting each individual
evidence propositions is to be aggregated into an overall measure of its overall
success in predicting the evidence.
To see how this works with Holistic Conditionalization*, let’s focus on




























The fraction on the left measures t
R
’s predictive success with respect
to a single evidence proposition: e
Ar











, and the denominator provides a
baseline against which that confidence is measured. Importantly, that baseline
of comparison need not be the prior probability of e
Ar
conditional on the set
of all of the background theories. Rather, it’s e
Ar
conditional on the set




In the example above, both theories regard e
Ar
as evidence, and so it happens



















does a better-than-baseline job of predicting
the evidence, and hence the value of the fraction on the left is greater than 1.
While the fraction on the left determines how the portion of the state
space occupied by ⌧
Ar
will be redistributed among its constituent background
theories, the fraction on the right determines the size of the probability space
to be redistributed. This is simply the credence in ⌧
Ar
divided by the sum of
the ⌧
i




.28 When the two fractions are
multiplied together we get a measure of t
N
’s success in predicting e
Ar
weighted
by the joint prior probability of all of the theories regarding e
Ar
as evidence.
Finally, taking the sum of these values for each evidence proposition generates
the value of  
tN .
3.5.1 Holistic Conditionalization* and
Immediate Perceptual Justification
The relationship between Je↵rey Conditionalization and Holistic Con-
ditionalization* is much like the relationship between Je↵rey Conditionaliza-
tion and Holistic Conditionalization. Je↵rey Conditionalization is a general-
28Note that if the ⌧
i








be equal to 1, and hence the fraction on the right could always be replaced by the relevant
⌧
i
. But the ⌧
i
don’t form a partition: theories can regard multiple propositions as evidence
and hence a single theory can be a member of multiple ⌧
i
. This is the case in our example
with t
N


























>}) input to Jef-
frey Conditionalization, and each rule determines the same posterior credence
function given that input. Evaluated as rules for responding to experience,
Holistic Conditionalization* has an explanatory advantage over Je↵rey Con-
ditionalization, since more of the work of determining a posterior credence
function is being done endogenously. The problem with Holistic Conditional-
ization was that its explanatory power came at the expense of accuracy, as it
prohibited revised credences in the background theories.
Holistic Conditionalization* shares Holistic Conditionalization’s advan-
tage over Je↵rey Conditionalization. The weights of its partition elements are
set equal to the product of two values that are themselves determined by the






. But because Holistic Conditionaliza-
tion* allows credences in background theories to change, it is not inaccurate
in precisely the same way as Holistic Conditionalization. Nonetheless, there’s
reason to worry that Holistic Conditionalization* is inaccurate in other ways.
Any apparent increase in explanatory power brings with it an increased chance
of getting something wrong. Holistic Conditionalization* has an explanatory
advantage over Je↵rey Conditionalization because it determines the weights
of the partition elements on the basis of the prior credence function, where as
Je↵rey Conditionalization o↵ers no account at all about the determinatnio of
29Here I’ve dropped the ‘!
i
’ in my specification of the output of Holistic Conditionaliza-









these weights. The potential problem for Holistic Conditionalization* is that
the weights that it specifies force agents to adopt inappropriate credences, just
as Holistic Conditionalization did.
Consider again the case in which I’m not sure whether the lighting is
normal or the lighting is red and then I have an experience as of a red hat. Ac-
cording to Holistic Conditionalization, my attitudes towards my various back-
ground beliefs partially determine what evidence I receive, but the evidence
that I receive does not influence my attitudes towards those background theo-
ries; my credence in them does not change across the learning episode. Holistic
Conditionalization* relaxes this constraint somewhat, allowing my attitudes
towards background beliefs to change in light of new evidence, but with a very
important caveat: the evidence that a↵ects a particular background theory is
limited to what that theory regards as evidence. For example, according to
background theory the lighting is red my experience as of the red hat does not
generate propositional evidence the hat is red, and hence my credence in that
theory is completely una↵ected by the fact that some other theory regards
that proposition as evidence.
Whether we welcome this aspect of Holistic Conditionalization* de-
pends on our other commitments in the epistemology of perception. Non-
skeptics about perceptual justification will agree that it’s at least possible
that I could become highly confident in the hat is red on the basis of my ex-
perience. (Non-skeptical) ‘Dogmatists’ about perception will go further and
claim that this high degree of confidence is immediate, in the sense that it’s
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the experience alone that makes me so-justified, rather than the experience to-
gether with antecedent justification for beliefs about the lighting, or about the
reliability of my perceptual faculties, or anything else.30 In this section I ar-
gue that Holistic Conditionalization* combines awkwardly with the possibility
of obtaining evidence that is both immediate and vulnerable to undermining
defeat, and hence combines awkwardly with non-skeptical Dogmatism about
perception.
Suppose that I have a visual experience of a red hat and on that basis
I increase my credence in the hat is red from 1/5 to 9/10 using Holistic Condi-
tionalization*. In order to avoid Weisberg’s puzzle, that proposition must be
one of the e
i





impossible to introduce a negative correlation between the hat is red and any
of its undermining defeaters. In other words, the hat is red must be among
the propositions whose credence is revised exogenously. But here’s the prob-
lem: when I update via Holistic Conditionalization*, my posterior credence
in the hat is red (and in every other exogenously revised proposition) will de-
pend upon my prior credences in the background theories that predict that
evidence in a way that is plausibly inconsistent with the immediacy of that
credence boost. This phenomenon will generalize to every other instance of
underminable perceptual learning, meaning that Holistic Conditionalization*
is arguably inconsistent with perceptual learning that is both immediate and
underminable.
30For more on Dogmatism see Pryor [2000], [2005], [2013].
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I’ll illustrate with an example. Suppose that I’m sure that either the
lighting is normal (=t
N
) or the lighting is red (=t
R
) and that my credence
in each is 1/5. If the lighting is normal then the evidence that my experience
generates consists in two propositions: e
r
= the hat is red and e
Ar
= it appears
as though the hat is red, but if the lighting is red then my evidence is only e
Ar
.






































By hypothesis, one result of my experience as of the red hat is to dra-
matically increase my confidence in e
r
, so that increase must be located some-
where in our equation. We would not normally expect a correlation between
something appearing to be red when illuminated by a red light and that thing

























) = [1/2 · 
tN ] + [1/10 · tR ]




) = 9/10. Clearly this will
require relatively large values for  
tN and  tR . But there’s a complication:
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when a theory’s -value is greater than 1, that theory receives a credence boost




form a partition, it follows
that in order for one to increase in credence the other must decrease:  
tN > 1
i↵  
tR < 1. Since 1/2 multiplier for  tN is larger than the 1/10 multiplier for
 
tR , achieving Pnew(er) = 9/10 requires that  tN increase dramatically at the
expense of  
tR . Unfortunately, given the way that  -values are defined, that’s
impossible.
Informally, the problem is that t
N
receives a credence boost for pre-
dicting evidence more successfully than t
R
only when both theories predict
that same evidence. But the only evidence that both theories predict is e
Ar
,
that the hat appears red, and in most plausible cases t
R
actually does a better




; after all, I’m more likely to see red hats when
the lighting is red than when the lighting is normal. That means that the
episode of learning will actually increase my credence in t
R
at the expense of
t
N
, precisely the opposite of what’s needed.
There are a number of ways to patch things up, but each is problematic





are independent and insist that they are strongly positively
correlated. This would improve the situation by increasing the multiplier for
 
tR ; increase that value enough and it no longer matters that  tN is somewhat
higher than  
tR . There are two problems with this approach: first, it just false
that there’s a strong correlation between something’s looking red under red
light and it actually being red, so this approach is ad hoc. Second, one of the
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desired outcomes of the case is that, after I’ve experienced the redness of the
hat and updated accordingly, t
R
should function as an undermining defeater
for e
r









. Hence on this approach there’s a
conflict between what’s required in order to obtain a high posterior credence
in e
r




— and what’s required in
order for t
R
to function as an undercutting defeater for e
r
: a weak correlation
between those propositions.
A second approach is to constrain the circumstances under which a
red-hat experience licenses a high credence in e
r
. Above I stipulated that













) = 1/20 and kept everything else was the
same, then even a  




While this approach is not completely implausible, it is arguably in-
consistent with the immediacy of my high credence in e
r
. If my high posterior
credence in e
r
depends upon my having a high prior credence in t
N
, and hence
in my having a high prior credence in ¬t
R
, then it’s plausible that my attitude
toward ¬t
R
is part of what makes it rational for me to have a high confidence
in e
r
.31 But this is precisely what Dogmatism and other theories of immediate
31This move can be resisted, as the sort of dependence relevant to the immediacy of
justification is arguably a special case the broader phenomenon of modal dependence. For
discussion see Kung [2010] and Zardini [2014].
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justification mean to rule out: the necessity of antecedently ruling out poten-
tial undermining defeaters for perceptually supported propositions before that
learning can take place. Hence Dogmatism and Holistic Conditionalization*
are inconsistent.32
3.6 Conclusion
From the perspective of the Dogmatist, Holistic Conditionalization* is
inadequate for the same reason Holistic Conditionalization and Strict Condi-
tionalization are inadequate. Each rule is a special case of Je↵rey Condition-
alization, di↵ering in that it imposes additional constraints upon the possible
inputs to the respective rule. And each rule is ultimately problematic because
these additional constraints prove to be too restrictive to model instances of
perceptual learning.
Strict Conditionalization restricts its inputs to propositional certain-
ties. But in the Bayesian framework propositional certainties are indefeasible,
and hence the inputs cannot be both immediate and vulnerable to undermin-
ing defeat. Holistic Conditionalization allows its propositional inputs to be
defeasible and uncertain, but in disallowing experience to a↵ect an agent’s
credences in their background theories it proves overly restrictive.
Finally, Holistic Conditionalization* allows inputs that are both defea-
32There’s a strong resemblance between my argument and the argument against the con-
sistency of Dogmatism with Strict Conditionalization advanced by White [2006] and others.
See Miller [forthcoming] for more detailed discussion.
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sible and uncertain, and also allows background theories to be confirmed or
disconfirmed based on their successful prediction of evidence received. It also
has a potential explanatory advantage over Je↵rey Conditionalization: while
both rules take as inputs a prior credence function together with a weighted
partition, Holistic Conditionalization specifies how the weights of the partition
elements are determined by the prior credence function, while Je↵rey Condi-
tionalization requires that those weights be specified independently. Unfortu-
nately, the restriction that provides this explanatory advantage is inconsistent
with the immediacy of perceptual justification.
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